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ESSAY
Dru Stevenson
Ethical Issues with Lawyers Openly Carrying Firearms
Abstract. Ethical concerns arise when lawyers openly carry firearms to
adversarial meetings related to representation, such as depositions and
settlement negotiations. Visible firearms introduce an element of intimidation,
or at least the potential for misunderstandings and escalation of conflicts. The
adverse effects of openly carried firearms can impact opposing parties,
opposing counsel, the lawyer’s potential clients, witnesses, and even judges and
jurors encountered outside the courtroom. The ABA’s Model Rules of
Professional Conduct in their current form include provisions that could be
applicable, such as rules against coercion and intimidation, but there is no
explicit reference to firearms. Several reported incidents with lawyers and
firearms have occurred in recent years, and as states liberalize their “open carry”
laws, as well as laws about guns in and around courthouses, the issue will arise
with increasing frequency. The time has come for an express ethical prohibition
of lawyers openly carrying firearms, at least in adversarial contexts. Such a rule
could take the form of an amended subsection to the Model Rules, an addition
to the official Comment to the Rules, or even in a formal ethics opinion from
the ABA. The ABA has already adopted a well-reasoned and well-supported
Resolution urging states to prohibit firearms from courthouses, and it should
follow this with ethical guidance for attorneys. In addition, state ethics
committees should promulgate similar rules, or issue ethics opinions,
discouraging or prohibiting lawyers from openly carrying firearms in adversarial
settings. Winner of the Claude E. Ducloux Prize for Excellence in Legal Ethics
Scholarship.
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A lawyer in Las Vegas was taking a deposition in 2018, and the exchange
grew heated.1 The lawyer became angry and began insulting the deponent
and his counsel, peppering his verbal jabs with profanity and vulgarities.2
Nothing about this scenario so far would be remarkable—depositions can
be acrimonious, and sometimes lawyers become angry and use foul
language. What made this situation remarkable was that the lawyer was
wearing a handgun in a side holster, and at one point, he pulled open his
suit jacket to make the gun more visible and asked the deponent if he was
“ready for it.”3 The deponent and his counsel rushed from the room and
headed directly to their car.4 As they were leaving the parking lot, the lawyer
caught up to them, still yelling angrily, and pounded on their car with his
fists as they drove away.5 The lawyer later told a reporter that he openly
carries a handgun every day, everywhere he goes.6
On a hot summer day in 2006, a police officer was sitting in his patrol car
in Springfield, Massachusetts, with a view of the entrance to the local
courthouse.7 He was surprised to observe a man in a suit wearing a sidearm
in a holster approach the entrance to the court; alarmed bystanders and
passersby signaled to the officer in the car.8 The officer stepped out of his
patrol car and approached the man to question him.9 The man with the gun
claimed he had a permit to carry the weapon and produced his license, which
also indicated he was an attorney.10 His suit jacket was open because of the
1. See In re Discipline of Pengilly, No. 74316, 2018 WL 4297851, at *1 (Nev. Sept. 7, 2018)
(describing Pengilly’s behavior during the deposition); Debra Cassens Weiss, Lawyer Is Suspended for
Flashing Gun at Deposition, Other ‘Appalling’ Behavior, A.B.A. J. (Sept. 13, 2018, 6:10 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/lawyer_is_suspended_for_flashing_gun_at_deposition_ot
her_appalling_behavior [https://perma.cc/8D8X-JHST] (“A Las Vegas lawyer has been suspended
from practice for six months and a day for deposition misconduct that included flashing a gun and
calling his litigation opponent derogatory names.”).
2. Pengilly, 2018 WL 4297851, at *1.
3. Id.
4. David Ferrara, Las Vegas Lawyer Accused of Wielding Handgun During Deposition, LAS VEGAS
REV. J. (Oct. 5, 2016, 6:13 PM), https://www.reviewjournal.com/crime/las-vegas-lawyer-accused-ofwielding-handgun-during-deposition/ [https://perma.cc/JG2C-7UAG].
5. Id.
6. Weiss, supra note 1.
7. Schubert v. City of Springfield, 589 F.3d 496, 499 (1st Cir. 2009).
8. Id.
9. See id. (“On Schubert’s account of the events, once Stern noticed Schubert’s partially
concealed weapon, the officer leaped from his cruiser in a ‘dynamic and explosive’ manner . . . . The
officer ordered Schubert to stop and put his hands in the air. Schubert complied. When asked if he
had a weapon, Schubert responded that he did and that he had a license to carry.”).
10. Id. at 500.
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temperature, though this resulted in the gun being visible to everyone
nearby.11 Calling a dispatcher to verify the gun permit took several minutes,
so the officer had the lawyer sit in the back of the patrol car while they
waited.12 The lawyer was on his way within ten minutes, but he was irate
about what had occurred, so he sued the officer and the city.13 The lawsuit
was unsuccessful.14
Most states have liberalized their “concealed carry” laws in recent years,15
and some have loosened restrictions on openly carrying firearms as well16—
many states already permitted open carry.17 In addition, most states have
11. Id. at 499.
12. Id. at 500.
13. Id.
14. See id. at 500, 504 (ruling in favor of Stern and dismissing the federal and state claims against
the City); Tim Hull, Gun-Toting Attorney Loses Civil Rights Appeal, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Dec. 29,
2009), https://www.courthousenews.com/gun-toting-attorney-loses-civil-rights-appeal/
[https://
perma.cc/2UKG-SA3U] (“A police officer did not violate a Massachusetts attorney’s civil rights by
stopping the lawyer in a high-crime area near a courthouse for carrying a holstered gun, the 1st Circuit
ruled.”).
15. See Carl T. Bogus, The Hard, Simple Truth About Gun Control, in GUNS IN LAW 88, 92–93
(Austin Sarat, et al., eds., 2019) (describing the trends in concealed carry and open carry laws); Shawn
E. Fields, Stop and Frisk in a Concealed Carry World, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1675, 1690 (2018) (“[A]s of 2015,
every state and the District of Columbia allow the public concealed carry of firearms.”); Hannah E.
Shearer, Jeopardizing “Their Communities, Their Safety, and Their Lives”: Forced Concealed Carry Reciprocity’s
Threat to Federalism, 45 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 429, 431–33 (2018) (discussing state variations in
concealed carry permit requirements); Adam Winkler, Is the Second Amendment Becoming Irrelevant?,
93 IND. L.J. 253, 264 (2018) (discussing the trend in state law).
16. See Lance Duroni, Out of the Home and in Plain Sight: Our Evolving Second Amendment and Open
Carry in Wisconsin, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 1305, 1306–07 (2019) (detailing how Wisconsin only denies
concealed carry permits in limited circumstances); Mary Beth Chappell Lyles, The Open Carry Library:
Navigating Gun Policies in the Age of Open Carry Laws and Mass Shootings, AM. ASS’N L. LIBRS. 31, Feb 2015,
https://www.aallnet.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Vol-19-No-4-open-carry.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/TRF4-JW5M] (mentioning changes in several state laws that resulted in more patrons openly
carrying guns into public libraries). In 2015, Texas changed its laws to permit open carry with licensing,
as well as openly carrying firearms on college campuses. Tex. H.B. 910, 84th Leg., R.S. (2015); see TEX.
GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.2031 (providing that a “license holder may carry a concealed handgun” while
on a college campus); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.03 (providing a person may possess a concealed
handgun on school grounds); Karen L. Hart, What Texas Property Owners Need to Know About Open Carry,
14 REAL EST. CONDEMNATION & TR. LITIG. COMMITTEE 4, 5–6, (2016) (describing the changes to
Texas law with the passage of H.B. 910). Similarly, in 2013 Arkansas amended its laws permitting
openly carrying firearms in public. 2013 Ark. Laws Act 746 (H.B. 1700); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73120(a) (West 2015); see J. Harrison Berry, Arkansas Open Carry: Understanding Law Enforcement’s Legal
Capability Under a Difficult Statute, 70 ARK. L. REV. 139, 139–40 (2017) (describing how Arkansas’s new
open carry law legalizes open carry of a firearm so long as the person possessing the firearm does not
intend to unlawfully use the gun as a weapon against another).
17. Bogus, supra note 15, at 91. Bogus reports that five states prohibit openly carrying firearms
in public, and of the remaining states, about one-third require some kind of license or permit for open
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passed preemption laws to prevent urban areas from having local ordinances
that restrict carrying guns in public.18 These legal changes have both
resulted from and contributed to a more open and expressive gun culture in
the United States.19 More people can, and do, carry firearms than before,
whether concealed or openly.20 Some lawyers have started to carry firearms
as well, and some carry them openly. As more lawyers do so, there will be
more incidents like the two stories above, as well as more occasions when
lawyers absent-mindedly try to pass through courthouse security screening
with a briefcase that contains a gun.21 There is a parallel trend for states to
repeal their longstanding bans on guns in government buildings, including
courthouses, so those with concealed carry permits can bring guns into
court buildings, and in some states, openly carrying firearms is now

carry, while the remaining two-thirds do not. Id.; cf. Jonathan Meltzer, Open Carry for All: Heller and
Our Nineteenth-Century Second Amendment, 123 YALE L.J. 1486, 1490 (2014) (arguing from historical
sources that “the right to carry weapons that is guaranteed by the Second Amendment is the right to
carry weapons openly.”).
18. See Richard Briffault, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1995, 1999 (2018)
(indicating forty-five states have passed laws that preempted local attempts at firearm regulation);
Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82, 133 (2013) (noting how preemption prevents local
gun regulations); Preemption of Local Laws, GIFFORDS L. CTR., https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gunlaws/policy-areas/other-laws-policies/preemption-of-local-laws/ [https://perma.cc/9897-DDA3]
(indicating state preemption has “removed authority from local governments to regulate guns and
ammunition”); Preemption: State by State, GIFFORDS L. CTR., https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gunlaws/state-law/50-state-summaries/preemption-state-by-state/ [https://perma.cc/PUG9-337K]
(outlining each state’s preemption laws). In 2006, Kristin Goss stated there were forty-five states with
partial or full preemption. KRISTIN A. GOSS, DISARMED: THE MISSING MOVEMENT FOR GUN
CONTROL IN AMERICA 164 (2006). For further discussion, see PHILIP J. COOK & KRISTIN A. GOSS,
THE GUN DEBATE: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 108–09 (2014) (discussing a ban on the sale
and possession of handguns in Morton Grove, which led to an increase in state preemption laws).
19. See Bogus, supra note 15, at 91 (describing the open carry movement and the mission of the
online community at OpenCarry.org).
20. See id. at 93 (showing an increase from 2.7 million to 11.1 million Americans having
concealed carry permits from 1999 to 2014).
21. See Catherine D. Perry, Lessons Learned As a New Chief Judge, 38 LITIG. 14, 15 (2011) (“Court
security metal detectors reveal a gun in the briefcase of a lawyer hurrying to court for a sanctions
hearing.”); David Hanners, Minnesota Supreme Court Sides with Lawyer in Briefcase Gun Case,
TWINCITIES.COM (July 10, 2012, 11:01 PM), https://www.twincities.com/2012/07/10/minnesotasupreme-court-sides-with-lawyer-in-briefcase-gun-case [https://perma.cc/AAW3-G9ET] (describing
when an attorney had a loaded revolver in his briefcase when he went through courtroom security);
Joe Patrice, Lawyer Brings Loaded Gun to Courthouse . . . That Was Probably A Mistake, ABOVE L. (June 24,
2019, 12:45 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2019/06/lawyer-brings-loaded-gun-to-courthouse-thatwas-probably-a-mistake/ [https://perma.cc/M9P8-946M] (describing a situation where an attorney
was stopped by courthouse security because he had a loaded gun in his bag).
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permissible in courthouses, though usually not inside courtrooms.22 In
states where open carry is permissible in courthouses, it simply expands the
number of scenarios and locations where lawyers wearing firearms will
encounter opposing parties, opposing counsel, witnesses, judges, and jurors.
The fact that others in the courthouse might have guns will motivate some
lawyers to bring their guns, too.
This Essay focuses primarily on situations like the first scenario—lawyers
who openly carry firearms to adversarial meetings outside a courthouse,
such as depositions, settlement conferences, and business negotiations, as
well as informal interviews with witnesses and meetings with clients. The
lawyer who brought a gun to the deposition and threatened to use it faced a
six-month-and-one-day suspension from the Nevada State Bar disciplinary
authority.23 The state bar, and the court that affirmed the decision, correctly
identified the lawyer’s conduct as an unethical intimidation tactic.24 As
open carry becomes more prevalent,25 and lawyers join in, these scenarios
will inevitably become more frequent. It is time for state ethics
commissions, and the American Bar Association, to provide more guidance
for attorneys and disciplinary authorities about the ethical boundaries of
openly carrying firearms to these law-related encounters. The second type
of scenario described above is also relevant to the professional conduct of
lawyers, even if it is less troubling. Even outside of the meeting context,
that is, where we can remove the concern about specific individuals (the
other party or opposing counsel) feeling intimidated by an openly-displayed
firearm,26 a lawyer’s professionalism in public places reflects on the legal
profession in that area and the public’s trust in the legal system. While there
is a strong argument that lawyers should not openly carry firearms in any
22. Jacob Gersham, New Battlefield Over Gun Rights: The Courthouse Itself, WALL STREET J. (July 9,
2017, 5:13 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-battlefield-over-gun-rights-the-courthouse-itself1499634821 [https://perma.cc/3U29-NAVW].
23. In re Discipline of Pengilly, No. 74316, 2018 WL 4297851, at *1 (Nev. Sept. 7, 2018).
24. See id. (finding the attorney “acted knowingly as he was consciously aware of his conduct
and knew his behavior was inappropriate”).
25. See Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical
Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1521 (2009) (“There is indeed an ‘open carry
movement’ of people who deliberately wear guns openly, as a means of trying to normalize such
behavior and of making a statement in favor of gun possession.”).
26. See Philip J. Cook, The Great American Gun War: Notes from Four Decades in the Trenches,
42 CRIME & JUST. 19, 33–34 (2013) (“Because guns provide the power to kill quickly, at a distance, and
without much skill or strength, they also provide the power to intimidate other people and gain control
of a violent situation without an actual attack.”); Meltzer, supra note 17, at 1520 (explaining how open
carry likely intimidates people around the carrier).
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work-related or representation-related context, the most urgent need for a
rule is in the situation of adversarial meetings, such as depositions and
negotiations.
Openly carrying a firearm to a meeting with an opposing party or counsel
presents a host of ethical concerns, in either a litigation or transactional
context. The first is the obvious intimidation effect, especially when those
on the other side are unarmed, as they normally would be.27 Open carry
“intimidates those around the carrier and makes the carrier appear
unreasonable to many.”28 Many of us find an openly-displayed gun at least
somewhat frightening or threatening, especially in contexts where it is a
surprise.29 It is less jarring to see a police officer or security guard wearing
a holstered sidearm than a briefcase-toting attorney, both due to familiarity
and due to widely-shared assumptions about training, duties, and
accountability of peace officers. How should the other parties interpret the
presence of the gun? That the lawyer is anticipating trouble or violence? Or
that the lawyer has pre-committed to killing someone if it seems necessary
and justified? Or merely that the lawyer wants to convey a don’t-mess-withme image or public persona? “Gun advocates value their weapons on
precisely this account: the gun on my hip says ‘don’t mess with me.’ But it
also tells the other party that this person is not of a mind to negotiate.”30
As Eugene Volokh observed:
To be sure, any discussion of open carry rights has a certain air of unreality.
In many places, carrying openly is likely to frighten many people, and to lead
to social ostracism as well as confrontations with the police. Most people are
aware that many neighbors own guns, and even that many people are licensed
to carry concealed guns and many others carry them illegally, but this abstract
knowledge doesn’t cause much worry. But when a gun is visible, it occupies
people’s attention in a way that statistical realities do not.31

27. See Aaron Bartula & Kendra Bowen, University and College Officials’ Perceptions of Open Carry on
College Campus, JUST. POL’Y J., Fall 2015, at 3 (stating the number of households with guns had
decreased over the decades).
28. Meltzer, supra note 17, at 1520.
29. See Lacey N. Wallace, Implied Threat or Part of the Scenery: Americans’ Perceptions of Open Carry,
22 J. RISK RES. 817, 827 (2019) (determining people felt more comfortable around those who open
carry on a normal day, so long as the carrier was not a stranger).
30. FIRMIN DEBRABANDER, DO GUNS MAKE US FREE?: DEMOCRACY AND THE ARMED
SOCIETY 154 (2015).
31. Volokh, supra note 25, at 1521.
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The second problem is the escalation effect, which can take two forms.
Displaying a lethal weapon at an entirely conversational meeting inevitably
alters the tone or mood of the meeting, even if the others do not necessarily
feel threatened.32 A gun carrier may misperceive a threat and shoot
unnecessarily,33 or may misperceive the danger or lethality in firing at an
People get it wrong very frequently, with tragic
opponent.34
consequences.35 Openly carrying a firearm to a deposition or settlement
negotiation unnecessarily raises the tension in a conversation that is already
inherently adversarial and often involves disagreements and arguments.
Nonlawyers present at such events often find the proceedings stressful, even
without bringing guns into the equation. A gun can easily have a chilling
effect on conversations, arguments, and free expression.36 Open carry is
disproportionately a white male phenomenon (by a wide margin), and visibly
carrying a firearm exacerbates the thorny issues with power dynamics that
already overshadow such meetings, especially the power dynamics involving

32. See DEBRABANDER, supra note 30, at 154 (describing the way firearms escalate violence in
interpersonal disputes and send a menacing, non-negotiable message to others).
33. See Mack v. State, 428 P.3d 326, 327–28 (Okla. Crim. App. 2018) (stating a defendant shot
and killed a man because he mistakenly thought the victim was armed); Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d
592, 595, 603, 617 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019) (stating the defendant shot an unarmed attacker who was
arguing with and hitting his father in front of their house); see also People v. Bennett, 96 N.E.3d 74, 83
(Ill App. Ct. 2017) (stating the defendant no longer faced danger of imminent harm when he shot and
killed victim, negating defendant’s self-defense claim); People v. Williams, 87 N.E.3d 353, 360
(Ill. App. Ct. 2017) (indicating the defendant’s mistaken belief of being in danger negated self-defense
claim).
34. See State v. Fitts, 803 S.E.2d 654, 658 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017) (recognizing defendant did not
intend to kill the victim).
35. See Savage v. State, 166 A.3d 183, 185 (Md. 2017) (describing how the defendant accidentally
shot and killed the victim when he was firing at someone else).
36. See Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns As Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment,
109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 1309–10 (2009) (observing that a publicly-visible firearm “has the effect of
chilling or distorting the essential channels of a democracy—public deliberation and interchange”);
Luke Morgan, Leave Your Guns at Home: The Constitutionality of a Prohibition on Carrying Firearms at Political
Demonstrations, 68 DUKE L.J. 175, 215 (2018) (arguing that openly-worn firearms chill free speech and
debate); John Feinblatt, Ban the Open Carry of Firearms, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/17/opinion/open-carry-charlottesville.html [https://perma.cc/
SNW9-538F] (focusing on how allowing open carry at public protests likely leads to terror for
bystanders); David Frum, The Chilling Effects of Openly Displayed Firearms, ATLANTIC (Aug. 16, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/08/open-carry-laws-mean-charlottesville-couldhave-been-graver/537087/ [https://perma.cc/ZK6C-QSG6 ] (pointing out that while black men have
been killed for legally carrying guns, white men in Charlottesville were successfully able to “play[]
vigilante” and “sen[d] a chilling message of warning to lawful protesters”).
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race,37 gender,38 physical or mental impairments, immigration status, and
poverty. To the extent that the lawyer already occupies a position of power
or dominance in many such meetings, wearing a gun merely reinforces the
unhealthy or unfair power dynamics.39 Disadvantaged persons are often
aware they face unequal outcomes in our legal system, and when the visible
firearm makes them think through scenarios where the lawyer might draw
or use it while they are present, the legal aftermath must appear daunting.
Of course, the ultimate escalation concern is that someone will lose his or
her temper when an adversarial discussion turns acrimonious, and the
person will draw or even fire the weapon in a fit of rage. This could be the
lawyer, for lawyers are not immune from becoming enraged,40 or someone
else present, such as a client or witness, who grabs the easily accessible gun
from the lawyer’s holster and uses it. Such scenarios would be rare but not
unthinkable.41 “Brandishing a weapon in the heat of an argument elevates
the dispute to another level. It is a definitive, and ominous warning that
peaceful negotiation and persuasion may be beyond reach.”42
A subtler form of escalation is the multiplication of guns brought to such
meetings. When the author has presented the topic of lawyers openly
carrying firearms to depositions as a discussion question in Professional
Responsibility courses, one common response from libertarian students is
that anyone who feels intimidated “should just bring their own gun.” One
hopes that most lawyers would not respond this way, but some would, and
some clients would too. If anyone else is carrying a firearm, they feel the
need to carry a firearm as well (for self-defense, or to level the field), and
37. See Wallace, supra note 29, at 825 (finding people of color felt less safe around people
carrying guns than white people).
38. See, e.g., Jennifer Carlson, Mourning Mayberry: Guns, Masculinity, and Socioeconomic Decline,
29 GENDER & SOC’Y 386, 389 (2015) (“As a form of hegemonic masculinity, masculine protectionism
shapes contemporary American gun politics.”).
39. See DEBRABANDER, supra note 30, at 186 (“This is the real selling point of guns: they give
an individual an advantage over others.”); see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 891 (2010)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Your interest in keeping and bearing a certain firearm may diminish my interest
in being and feeling safe from armed violence.”).
40. See Iowa Supreme Court Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Blessum, 861 N.W.2d 575, 578
(Iowa 2015) (regarding a lawyer who assaulted his client); In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against
Perez-Pena, 168 P.3d 408, 410–11 (Wash. 2007) (en banc) (discussing a lawyer who assaulted a client
during an argument); Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Robinson, 736 S.E.2d 18, 21 (W. Va. 2012) (regarding
a lawyer who beat his client with a baseball bat).
41. See, e.g., Rowell v. Wimberly, 312 So. 2d 369, 370 (La. Ct. App. 1975) (describing how an
attorney shot his client’s father-in-law in the knee at a confrontational meeting at the client’s residence).
42. DEBRABANDER, supra note 30, at 154.
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maybe even a more intimidating firearm (larger, more powerful, or with a
larger-capacity magazine), more firearms, or a more visible firearm.43 As
the number of guns present at such adversarial meetings multiplies, the
potential for problems increases exponentially. Even apart from the
problem of the other side reciprocating, retaliating, or ratcheting up, open
carry escalates gun problems by normalizing the ubiquity of firearms in
previously nonviolent situations.44
A response from state ethics committees or the ABA could take one of
three forms, with different levels of seriousness. At the least, a formal ethics
opinion could expressly declare that openly carrying firearms to adversarial
meetings with other parties—such as depositions and settlement
negotiations—is improper conduct for an attorney and violates existing
rules such as ABA Model Rule 8.4. This is what the Nevada disciplinary
authority and court held.45 A more serious approach to this issue would be
to add a section (a few sentences) to the ABA’s official Comment to Model
Rule 8.4, stating that the Rule applies to openly carrying firearms. Ideally,
the strongest response would be the adoption of a Rule provision by the
ABA addressing the issue, but this takes the most time and is the most
difficult to achieve.
Of course, lawyers also may not act in violation of the rules of
professionalism through the conduct of another, including their clients,
employees, contractors, and interns. Several provisions of the Model Rules
expressly prohibit vicarious or directed violations, including Rule 8.4. Thus,
there is a secondary and unavoidable issue here regarding clients and other
agents or employees of the attorney, including support staff, investigators,
and witnesses, who openly carry firearms to adversarial law-related
meetings. This Essay, therefore, argues that lawyers have an ethical duty to
discourage, if not prevent, persons they bring to a deposition or negotiation
from openly wearing sidearms or rifles. At the least, it should be improper
43. Id. at 186.
44. See id. (explaining the presumption of people who wield guns against others is that their
opponent is either not armed or not as well armed as they are). This is the mirror-image of the deescalation effect described by other commentators when discussing gun regulations. See Alfred
Blumstein, Violence Certainly Is the Problem—And Especially with Hand Guns, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 945,
966 (1998) (“To the extent that the general level of carrying guns was diminished, that reduced the
incentive for others to carry guns, and so a reverse of the escalation process could have been set in
motion.”).
45. In re Discipline of Pengilly, No. 74316, 2018 WL 4297851, at *1 (Nev. Sept. 7, 2018) (finding
an attorney violated the state equivalent of ABA Model Rule 8.4 when he brandished his gun in front
of opposing counsel and opposing counsel’s client).
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for an attorney to encourage or direct a client, employee, or other agent to
bring weapons to such a meeting.
An ethical rule prohibiting lawyers from openly carrying firearms to
adversarial meetings does not significantly infringe on the lawyer’s Second
Amendment rights. Lawyers would still be able to own firearms for
self-defense, the core concern in District of Columbia v. Heller,46 they could
still openly carry firearms outside of these situations related to legal
representation,47 and they would even still be free to have concealed
firearms at these encounters because a concealed weapon would not pose
the same risks of intimidation and escalation.48 Most ethical rules governing
lawyer conduct place moderate limitations on lawyer speech, association, or
right to contract, and courts have upheld many disciplinary rules and
licensing requirements in the face of constitutional challenges. A rule
against lawyers openly carrying firearms to certain types of meetings does
not infringe on Second Amendment rights any more than duties of
confidentiality or disclosure infringe on free expression rights.
The discussion below proceeds in three parts. Following this
introduction, Part I sets forth the argument that openly carrying a firearm,
at least to adversarial law-related meetings, violates existing provisions of
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Moreover, Part I argues that
given the growing popularity of open carry and its symbolic allure for the
carriers, an express prohibition for lawyers is necessary, whether in the form
of ethics opinions, an amendment to the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct Comments, or a new, amended Model Rule provision. Part II
attempts to answer, or rebut, the Second Amendment objections that may
arise against such a rule, fleshing out the points made in the foregoing
paragraph. Following the constitutional discussion, Part III connects the
proposed rule to other statutes that prohibit or punish, the carrying of
firearms in some other context, such as drug trafficking. Making the point
is that our legal system has long-established rules, and well-developed policy
rationales, for discouraging the open display of weapons in certain contexts.
A brief conclusion will summarize the main arguments and suggest some
further areas for ethical inquiry regarding lawyers’ use or carrying of
firearms.
46. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
47. See id. at 605–06 (discussing the legal analysis of the Second Amendment protecting
individual rights to bear arms “as necessary for self-defense”).
48. See Volokh, supra note 25, at 1521–23 (discussing people’s ability to defend themselves
through concealed carry and how concealed carry is more respectful to others).
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I. OPENLY CARRYING A FIREARM VIOLATES EXISTING RULES
OF LEGAL ETHICS
A. “Open Carry” and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC) is a set of nonbinding rules adopted by the ABA in 1983, which the ABA has amended
several times since.49 Though each state enacts its own ethics laws,
forty-nine states have adopted the MRPC in whole or in part.50 The MRPC
requirements and principles provide a baseline standard for ethical conduct
for lawyers. One fundamental consideration underlying the rules in the
MRPC is the proposition that “legal institutions in a constitutional
democracy depend on popular participation and support to maintain their
authority.”51 To that end, attorneys have a duty to uphold the legal process
and “to avoid conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative
process.”52 Attorneys are also obliged to maintain “a professional,
courteous and civil attitude toward all persons involved in the legal
system.”53 These duties, as well as several specific rules, prohibit attorneys
from engaging in activity that can be interpreted as coercive, harassing, or
otherwise unprofessional.
The existing provisions of the ABA’s Model Rules prohibit intimidation
tactics, threats of violence, and other overbearing behavior by attorneys.54
The easiest to apply is Model Rule 8.4(d),55 which prohibits conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice. This is a provision disciplinary
49. Model Rules of Professional Conduct: About the Model Rules, AM. BAR ASS’N,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_pr
ofessional_conduct/ [https://perma.cc/7UBE-GUTR].
50. Han Ding, Bargaining in the Shadow of Cameras: Videotaping Negotiations to Enforce Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, 32 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 325, 326 (2017); see Art Hinshaw & Jess K. Alberts,
Doing the Right Thing: An Empirical Study of Attorney Negotiation Ethics, 16 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 95, 101
n.24 (2011) (noting every state except California bases its lawyer ethical-disciplinary code on the Model
Rules).
51. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT ¶ pmbl. 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
52. Id. r. 3.3 cmt. 2.
53. Id. ¶ pmbl. 9.
54. For an excellent discussion, see Allen K. Harris, Increasing Ethics, Professionalism and Civility:
Key to Preserving the American Common Law and Adversarial Systems, 2005 PROF. LAW. 91, 97 (2005) (noting
how many younger lawyers are “subjected to the stress of sexist, racist, ethnic and other insulting tactics
by opportunistic, unprincipled and overly aggressive lawyers who seek to gain an edge by the use of
intimidation tactics”).
55. MODEL RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(d) (classifying “engag[ing] in conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice” as an ethics violation).
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boards often apply to abusive behavior toward others.56 Rule 8.4(d) also
covers coercive, abusive, or inappropriate behavior toward opposing parties,
opposing counsel, and witnesses.57 Threatening, intimidating, or otherwise
abusive behavior toward clients also violates Rule 8.4(d).58 Rule 8.4(d),
therefore, is the provision that most easily applies to lawyers who display
firearms while representing clients in adversarial settings as a show of
dominance, or to show that they are indomitable (a difference that may
matter in the mind of the gun carrier, but not in the minds of observers).
Other sections of Rule 8.4 can come into play, depending on whether a
lawyer in an adversarial setting merely wears the gun visibly, verbally
56. See Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Rozbicki, 167 A.3d 351, 361 (Conn. 2017) (finding a
Rule 8.4(d) violation where a lawyer repeated unfounded attacks on the integrity of certain judges in
court filings and oral arguments); Fla. Bar v. Ratiner, 238 So. 3d 117, 122 (Fla. 2018) (finding a
Rule 8.4(d) violation where a lawyer kicked opposing counsel’s table and disrupted proceedings); In re
Clothier, 344 P.3d 370, 375–76 (Kan. 2015) (per curiam) (finding a Rule 8.4(d) violation where a lawyer
accused opposing counsel of dishonesty, spoke threateningly to other attorneys, and engaged in
threatening conduct in the presence of the judge’s administrative assistant); In re Small, 294 P.3d 1165,
1180 (Kan. 2013) (per curiam) (finding a Rule 8.4(d) violation where a lawyer threatened and
intimidated opposing counsel, a judge, a former client, and people from the disciplinary tribunal); In re
DeJean, 264 So. 3d 424, 425–29 (La. 2019) (per curiam) (finding a violation of Rules 8.4(b) and (d)
where a lawyer exchanged words with the district attorney, physically confronted him and “chest
bumped” him); Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Mixter, 109 A.3d 1, 67–68 (Md. 2015) (stating that, among
other ethical violations, a Rule 8.4(d) violation occurred where a lawyer acted abusively toward
colleagues, and, unrelated to case proceedings, tried to use individuals’ private medical records “purely
to harass members of the public”); In re Disciplinary Action Against Torgerson, 870 N.W.2d 602, 607
(Minn. 2015) (per curiam) (finding a Rule 8.4(d) violation where a lawyer shouted at court staff); N.C.
State Bar v. Foster, 808 S.E.2d 920, 924–25 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017) (finding a Rule 8.4(d) violation where
an attorney addressed a magistrate judge with vulgarities and insults).
57. See In re Fletcher, 424 F.3d 783, 788, 790–91 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding a lawyer violated
Rule 8.4(d) by trying “to harass, humiliate and intimidate deponents and their counsel” by, among other
things, grossly mischaracterizing deponents’ statements and taking statements out of context); Fla. Bar
v. Adams, 198 So. 3d 593, 619–20 (Fla. 2016) (per curiam) (finding a Rule 8.4(d) violation by lawyers
who surreptitiously orchestrated a DUI arrest of opposing counsel); In re Moore, 665 N.E.2d 40, 41–
42 (Ind. 1996) (per curiam) (finding conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice when a
lawyer “struck opposing counsel”); In re Greenburg, 9 So. 3d 802, 806–07 (La. 2009) (per curiam)
(finding a Rule 8.4(d) violation where lawyers hurled obscenities at each other in open court); In re
Eisenstein, 485 S.W.3d 759, 761–63 (Mo. 2016) (en banc) (finding a Rule 8.4(d) violation when a lawyer
sent opposing counsel an email saying, “Be careful what you say. I’m not someone you really want to
make a lifelong enemy of, even though you are off to a pretty good start.”).
58. See In re Freeman, 835 N.E.2d 494, 498 (Ind. 2005) (determining Rule 8.4(d) was violated
when a lawyer replied to a disgruntled former client’s demand for a refund by threatening to “make
trouble” for the former client); Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Basinger, 109 A.3d 1165, 1170
(Md. 2015) (holding a violation of Rule 8.4(d) where a lawyer sent a client vulgar, insulting letters);
State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Moody, 394 P.3d 223, 225–27 (Okla. 2017) (finding a Rule 8.4(d)
violation where a lawyer left threatening voicemails for a client who refused to pay legal fees).
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threatens to use it, or draws the weapon to brandish it. For example,
Rule 8.4(b) subjects a lawyer to discipline for committing “a criminal act that
reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a
lawyer in other respects,”59 and the related Comment leads the list of
examples with “[o]ffenses involving violence.”60 A number of lawyer
disbarment and suspension cases involve firearm convictions, and the courts
or attorney disciplinary authorities consistently highlight the firearm
component of the illegal act that led to the criminal conviction.61 Of
course, convictions for most firearm-related crimes already come well
within the ambit of Rule 8.4(b), so no amendment to the rules or
clarification in the comment or ethics opinions would be necessary to cover
59. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
60. Id. r. 8.4(b) cmt. 2.
61. See People v. Hook, 91 P.3d 1070, 1073–75 (Colo. 2004) (issuing a three-year suspension
under both Rule 8.4(b) and (d) for a lawyer who pled guilty to misdemeanors after he fired shots into
a bar where the bartender refused him service due to his intoxication); In re Runyon, 491 N.E.2d 189,
190 (Ind. 1986) (disbarring a lawyer after he was convicted of possessing unregistered machine guns
and silencers, forcing his way into his ex-wife’s apartment, beating her with a club, and holding her at
gunpoint); In re Stephens, 955 So. 2d 140, 143, 145 (La. 2007) (disbarring a lawyer after a jury convicted
him of robbing three banks at gunpoint); In re Martin, 888 So. 2d 178, 181–82 (La. 2004) (taking
disciplinary action under Rule 8.4(b) after a lawyer’s felony conviction for having a stand-off with and
discharging a pistol at police); In re Disciplinary Action Against Light, 765 N.W.2d 536, 539
(N.D. 2009) (disbarring a lawyer after he was convicted of pointing a handgun, while intoxicated, at a
police officer during a traffic stop); In re Lewis, 554 N.Y.S.2d 68, 69 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (handing
down a two-year suspension to a lawyer who pled guilty to firing a gun into another person’s
apartment); Disciplinary Counsel v. Howard, 914 N.E.2d 377, 381 (Ohio 2009) (issuing a two-year
suspension for a lawyer convicted of discharging a firearm toward a police officer); Disciplinary
Counsel v. LoDico, 888 N.E.2d 1097, 1099 (Ohio 2008) (rendering an indefinite suspension after a
lawyer was convicted of pointing a firearm at several bar patrons); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v.
Hastings, 395 P.3d 552, 553 (Okla. 2017) (finding a Rule 8.4(b) violation where a lawyer “pointed a
gun at his ex-wife and threatened her life”); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Conrady, 275 P.3d 133, 135
(Okla. 2012) (stating a lawyer broke into his ex-girlfriend’s home and shot rounds throughout the
dwelling and then fired rounds into her parked vehicle); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Badger, 912 P.2d
312, 314–15 (Okla. 1995) (issuing a six-month suspension under Rule 8.4 for a lawyer’s illegal purchase
and possession of machine guns); In re McMaster, 795 S.E.2d 853, 855 (S.C. 2017) (issuing a three-year
suspension under Rule 8.4(b) for a lawyer who pled guilty to unlawfully carrying a pistol while
intoxicated); In re Cooper, 725 S.E.2d 491, 493 (S.C. 2012) (providing lawyer faced charges that
included pointing gun at his son’s girlfriend during argument); In re Ervin, 694 S.E.2d 6, 9 (S.C. 2010)
(suspending a lawyer after pleading guilty to pointing a firearm at another car during road rage incident);
In re Patrick, 702 S.E.2d 566, 567 (S.C. 2010) (disbarring a lawyer convicted of assault with a weapon);
Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Santa Barbara, 749 S.E.2d 633, 641 (W. Va. 2013) (rendering a three-month
suspension under Rules 8.4(b) and (d) for a lawyer who brandished a handgun while confronting a
group of people); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Schuh, 730 N.W.2d 152, 154 (Wisc. 2007)
(finding a Rule 8.4(b) violation for a lawyer convicted of knowingly possessing a firearm in furtherance
of a drug trafficking crime).
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most of these cases. Even so, some cases indicate uncertainty at the
margins, which warrant clarification in this area from the ABA and state
ethics panels. The cases, taken together, suggest that armed lawyers at times
exercise the same type of poor judgment with firearms that nonlawyers do.
On the one hand, some states have disciplined lawyers for illegal firearm
activities that ultimately did not lead to criminal charges or convictions, as
in the case of Iowa Supreme Court Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Barry,62 in which a
county attorney used forfeited and seized guns and ammunition from the
sheriffs’ evidence lockup for shooting practice (state law required such
firearms go to the attorney general for disposition or destruction), in
addition to some financial misconduct.63 Similarly, in People v. Senn,64 a
lawyer discharged a pistol over his wife’s head to frighten her and threatened
to kill her during a drunken argument; criminal charges were eventually
dropped, but the judiciary nonetheless imposed a public censure
(reprimand).65 On the other hand, some courts have refused to find a
violation of Rule 8.4(b), even where there was a felony conviction for a
firearm offense if the crime did not seem to reflect on the lawyer’s
truthfulness or integrity; however, the decisions are inconsistent. For
example, in Iowa Supreme Court Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Keele,66 the lawyer
received a plea-bargained deferred judgment in a first-time drug offense, but
a felony conviction for possessing a firearm while being an unlawful user of
or addicted to controlled substances, a violation of federal law.67 Attorney
Keele legally agreed to take and store a firearm for the benefit of his client
and stored it unloaded in an empty closet before his struggles with addiction
began.68 The state disciplinary authority imposed a public reprimand on
Keele for his drug arrest.69 On the federal felony charge of being a drug
user in possession of a firearm, however, a jury convicted Keele, and the
judge—after an unsuccessful appeal to the Eighth Circuit—sentenced him
to three years’ probation.70 The state disciplinary authority then sought to
impose a nine-month suspension of Keele’s law license for violating
62. Iowa Supreme Court Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Barry, 762 N.W.2d 129 (Iowa 2009).
63. See id. at 138 (holding attorney acted adversely to the practice of law by improperly using
firearms forfeited to the state).
64. People v. Senn, 824 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1992) (en banc).
65. Id. at 823.
66. Iowa Supreme Court Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Keele, 795 N.W.2d 507 (Iowa 2011).
67. Id. at 510.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 510–11.
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Rules 8.4(b) and (d), but the Iowa Supreme Court rejected this
recommendation and dismissed the grievance, finding that his conduct
(lapsing into drug abuse while he happened to be storing a client’s firearm
in a locked closet) did not adversely reflect on his fitness to practice law.71
Of course, the facts in Keele’s case are unusual.
More typical are the circumstances in In re Funk,72 which resulted in
disbarment. Funk pled guilty to charges of possession of marijuana and
felony possession of firearms by an unlawful drug user.73 Funk did not
respond to the state disciplinary board’s inquiries or appear in the
proceedings, and the board recommended disbarment, which the Delaware
Supreme Court accepted and ordered.74
Model Rule 8.4(e) prohibits a lawyer from implying “an ability . . . to
achieve results by means that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or
other law.”75 To the extent that the lawyer’s visible firearm, or the lawyer’s
verbal references to it, imply or hint that the lawyer is willing to use violence,
even as a last resort, but at the boundary of legality, this provision would
seemingly apply.
The newest provision in Rule 8.4 is subsection (g), amended in 2016 with
content that was previously in the Rule Comment, forbids harassment and
discrimination by lawyers.76 Comment 4 applies this provision not only to
the lawyer’s clients, but to interactions with “witnesses, coworkers, court
personnel, and others while engaged in the practice of law[.]”77 Given the
history of interracial firearm violence in our country, and the shocking
prevalence of gun violence in domestic violence cases, this Rule could apply
to a lawyer openly carrying a gun to an adversarial encounter with a person
71. Id. at 511, 515.
72. In re Funk, 742 A.2d 851 (Del. 1999).
73. Id. at 853.
74. Id. at 854–55.
75. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(e) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020); see In re Johnson,
74 N.E.3d 550, 553–54 (Ind. 2017) (finding a violation of Rule 8.4(e) where a public defender
suggested to his ex-girlfriend that he could influence her probation officer and judge in the criminal
case against her); In re Dickson, 968 So. 2d 136, 139–42 (La. 2007) (finding a violation of Rule 8.4(e)
when a lawyer asked a client for money to pay off the judge and district attorney); In re Disciplinary
Action Against Andrade, 736 N.W.2d 603, 604–05 (Minn. 2007) (holding as a violation of Rule 8.4(e)
where a lawyer told his client he needed money to bribe police officials); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n
v. Moon, 295 P.3d 1, 9 (Okla. 2012) (holding a violation of Rule 8.4(e) where lawyer arrested for a
DWI “invoked the names of respected members of the legal community in an attempt to avoid
prosecution and gain favorable treatment”).
76. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
77. Id. r. 8.4 cmt. 4.
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of color, depending on the context, and should apply if the lawyer brings a
gun to a meeting with a woman known by the lawyer to be the victim of
traumatic firearm threats or shootings in a domestic violence situation.
In addition, Model Rule 3.5(d) prohibits lawyers from engaging in
“conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal,”78 and Comment 5 says that this
provision applies to depositions.79 To the extent that the presence of the
gun is foreseeably disruptive, that is, likely to distract and upset other parties,
creates a chilling effect on the deposition, or prompts others to leave the
meeting, Rule 3.5(d) should be applicable. “Guns by their very nature cut
off communication, or indicate that its end is near.”80 Permitting even the
appearance of such impropriety would be contrary to one of the core
purposes of the MRPC: maintaining the public’s confidence in the rule of
law and the justice system. Comment 4 to Rule 3.5 states, “[r]efraining from
abusive or obstreperous conduct is a corollary of the advocate’s right to
speak on behalf of litigants.”81
Another relevant provision could be Model Rule 4.4, which prohibits
lawyers from using “means that have no substantial purpose other than
to . . . burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that
violate the rights of such a person.”82 If a lawyer openly carries a firearm
to depositions or settlement meetings as a way of signaling dominance or
intimidating others into acquiescence, such as agreeing to demands or
divulging material information, the lawyer is burdening the person and
arguably infringing on legal rights. Rule 4.4 applies not only to opposing
parties and their counsel, but to other third parties—such as witnesses,
investigators, and rival businesses of the client.83
Similarly, other Model Rules requiring lawyers to respect the rights of
third parties, such as Rules 3.4(f) (pertaining to potential witnesses)84 and
Rule 4.3 (dealing with unrepresented persons),85 could be relevant if the
lawyer’s firearm functions as an intimidation tactic against witnesses,
potential parties, and so on. Rule 3.4(f) prohibits lawyers from requesting a

78. Id. r. 3.5(d).
79. Id. r. 3.5 cmt. 5.
80. DEBRABANDER, supra note 30, at 178.
81. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.5 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
82. Id. r. 4.4.
83. Id.
84. See id. r. 3.4(f) (stating a lawyer shall not request a witness to withhold information).
85. See id. r. 4.3 (listing conduct an attorney shall refrain from engaging in towards
unrepresented persons).
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person other than their client to refrain from voluntarily giving relevant
information to another party, with a few narrow exceptions. The rule’s
primary purpose is the protection of the third party’s interests. The
intimidating nature of a visible weapon changes the balance of power and
the implication of the request. When an armed attorney asks an individual
to “keep quiet,” the request smacks of improper influence. Rule 4.3 is, on
its face, less applicable—the wording focuses only on the potential for
unrepresented opposing parties to misunderstand the lawyer’s loyalties.86
Even so, the values that undergird Rule 4.3—“the possibility that the lawyer
will compromise the unrepresented person’s interests”87—would warrant
special concerns about lawyers wearing firearms to intimidate unrepresented
opposing parties. If the individual had their lawyer present, their lawyer
might raise an objection to the presence of a visible firearm. In contrast, an
unrepresented individual is more likely to acquiesce to the compromising of
her rights.
More attenuated, but not completely unthinkable, is the problem of
lawyers interacting with potential clients, Model Rules 7.388 and 1.18,89
where the lawyer’s openly carried firearm could affect a client who is trying
to negotiate over the lawyer’s fees, consent to a conflict of interest, litigation
financing, the scope of the representation, or the allocation of authority
between the lawyer and the client in the contemplated representation.
Rule 7.3 prohibits attorneys from using coercion or harassment to solicit
employment.90 The comments to the Rule state that live, person-to-person
solicitation is not appropriate when the targeted individual “may be
especially vulnerable to coercion or duress.”91 The presence of a visible
firearm during solicitations could be inherently coercive. Any person is
particularly vulnerable to coercion or duress when faced with an openly
armed individual, even if the armed party is a lawyer.
The Nevada lawyer who brought a gun to the deposition in the story
above was James Pengilly, and the Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board
suspended his license to practice for six months and a day, which the
86. See id. (“When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person
misunderstands the lawyer’s role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the
misunderstanding.”).
87. Id. r. 4.3 cmt. 2.
88. See id. r. 7.3 (listing rules for solicitation of clients).
89. See id. r. 1.18 (listing duties owed to prospective client).
90. Id. r. 7.3.
91. Id. r. 7.3 cmt. 6.
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Nevada Supreme Court affirmed.92 The specific rule violated was Nevada
Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(d),93 which is identical to the ABA’s
Model Rule 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).
Pengilly’s threatening display of his firearm (even if it remained in the
holster), was disruptive to the proceeding because the unfinished deposition
ended abruptly, and necessitated a protective order from the discovery
commissioner, both of which imposed delays on the case.94 Despite
Pengilly’s contention that his sanction was too severe, the Nevada Supreme
Court held that suspension was the “baseline sanction” because of the gun:
“Further, there was the potential for serious injury to every one present—
the deponent, his attorney, the court reporter, Pengilly’s office staff, and
even Pengilly himself—because a deadly weapon was involved.”95
Throughout the incident, the court reporter continued recording the
conversation, and the transcript reveals opposing counsel’s fear through
statements such as, “Hey, hey, hey, I don’t want to get shot,” and, “What
are you doing now? If you pull the gun, I’m going to call the police.”96
An even more disturbing incident with a gun occurred at a deposition in
Louisiana. As the deposition mired in an argument, one lawyer menacingly
suggested to the other that they “step outside,” prompting the other,
Nicholas Estiverne, to leave and return a few minutes later pointing a
handgun at the first lawyer.97 The state disciplinary authorities concluded
that Estiverne had violated Rules 8.4(a), (b), (c), and (d), as well as Rule 4.4
(all of which track the ABA Model Rules verbiage and numbering), and
applied a year-and-one-day suspension.98 In this case, however, the
attorney attended the deposition unarmed and only retrieved his weapon
after the deposition prematurely ended due to a dispute between himself
and opposing counsel.99
In 2015, a California appellate court upheld terminating sanctions against
a lawyer who brandished pepper spray and a stun gun at a deposition,
92. In re Discipline of Pengilly, No. 74316, 2018 WL 4297851, at *2 (Nev. Sept. 7, 2018).
93. NEV. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(d) (2019).
94. Pengilly, 2018 WL 4297851, at *2.
95. Id.
96. Debra Cassens Weiss, Lawyer Denies Brandishing His Gun During a Deposition; Court Reporter
Kept Typing in Tense Situation, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 6, 2016, 11:06 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/
article/motion_claims_lawyer_pulled_out_a_gun_during_deposition_court_reporter_cont [https://
perma.cc/A8BP-6APF].
97. In re Estiverne, 741 So. 2d 649, 650 (La. 1999).
98. Id. at 653–54.
99. Id.
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threatening to use both on opposing counsel, and then discharged the stun
gun near opposing counsel’s face, narrowly missing him.100 The state bar
eventually disbarred the lawyer.101
Even where the proceeding is not acrimonious, participants still perceive
the presence of a gun as a threat. One attorney’s website recounted an
experience where his client, after observing the deponent’s concealed gun,
cautioned the attorney about it before the attorney “destroy[ed]” the
deponent too effectively.102 Upon realizing the deponent was, in fact,
armed, the attorney refused to continue until the deponent removed his gun
from the room; the attorney saw no other reason for the gun’s presence
except as a means of intimidation.103 The deponent removed his gun only
after justifications and threats failed. Another attorney’s article recounted
an incident where his client refused to continue a deposition upon viewing
opposing counsel’s gun because “he was deathly afraid of guns.”104
How people perceive guns in the context of interactions with attorneys
may depend in part on how they perceive the circumstances that necessitate
an attorney’s presence.105 For example, socioeconomic groups have
different perceptions of the criminal justice institution and their interactions
with it; many members of disadvantaged groups already view the system as
unfair or unreliable. The latest Gallup Poll on institutional confidence
indicates that the citizenry overall has little confidence in the criminal justice
system, with 34% having “very little” confidence in the system and only
10% having a “great deal” of confidence.106 The moderate responses
between these extremes substantially favored the negative end of the
confidence spectrum.107 Oddly, polls suggest that Americans feel more

100. Crawford v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 195 Cal. Rptr. 3d 868, 870 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).
101. Crawford v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., ETHICS QUART., Jan.
2016, at 5–6.
102. William C. Sussman, Gun at Mediation, MEDIATOR MAN (Sept. 27, 2015),
https://www.mediatorman.com/gun-at-mediation/ [https://perma.cc/2D5P-R4EY].
103. Id.
104. Michael A. Geibelson, Congratulations on Passing the Bar Exam, L.A. LAW., Fall 2006, at 1.
105. See Daniel Horwitz, Open-Carry: Open-Conversation or Open-Threat?, 15 FIRST AMEND. L. REV.
96, 117 (2016) (“Guns cannot convey speech without an action by an individual, but any time an
individual openly displays a gun, intentional or not, the message is clear: that individual now has the
power to kill.”).
106. Confidence in Institutions, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1597/confidenceinstitutions.aspx [https://perma.cc/W6NZ-Q73Z].
107. See id. (showing 40% of Americans have “some” confidence in the criminal justice system
as compared to a meager 14% that have “quite a lot” of confidence).
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confidence in policing institutions than in the criminal justice system.108
Furthermore, a majority of Americans feel the criminal justice system
manifests unfairness; for example, 87% of black adults believe that black
individuals are treated less fairly by the criminal justice system than white
individuals, and 61% of white adults concur.109 Adversarial proceedings
suffer from a perception of unfairness that undermines the social and
political legitimacy of our legal institutions.110 Even individual perceptions
of criminality contain implicit biases that can work insidiously in the
background of legal presumptions of guilt or innocence.111 All of these
perceptions bear on how individuals view and interact with the system, and
how the people who comprise the system view and interact with those who
are subject to the system.112
Against this background, individual interactions with the criminal justice
system or its subjects never begin with a clean slate. Even apart from a
general lack of confidence, an individual may expect unfair treatment or
enter the justice process with feelings of victimization and/or
vulnerability.113 Individuals may perceive prosecutors as the institution,
108. See id. (reflecting 24% to 31% of Americans in each of the high, moderately high, and
moderate confidence responses but 16% of Americans have “very little” confidence in the police).
109. Juliana Menasce Horowitz et al., Race in America 2019, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 9, 2019),
https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2019/04/09/race-in-america-2019/#majorities-of-black-andwhite-adults-say-blacks-are-treated-less-fairly-than-whites-in-dealing-with-police-and-by-the-criminaljustice-system [https://perma.cc/QDG5-BQM7].
110. Katherine J. Rosich, Race, Ethnicity, and the Criminal Justice System, AM. SOCIOLOGICAL
ASS’N, Sept. 2007, at 1, 2, https://www.asanet.org/sites/default/files/savvy/images/press/docs/pdf
/ASARaceCrime.pdf [https://perma.cc/YQ7C-8A8N].
111. See, e.g., Comm. on Law and Justice, The Criminal Justice System and Social Exclusion: Race,
Ethnicity, and Gender, NAT’L ACADEMIES SCI., ENGINEERING, MED., at 1, 3 (Sept. 2018),
https://www.nap.edu/read/25247/chapter/1#3 [https://perma.cc/DF35-DSPB] (“[W]hite survey
respondents overestimate the proportion of crime committed by African Americans by 20 to 30% and
suggest harsher punishments when a crime is perceived to be a ‘black crime.’”).
112. See Tim Hallett & Marc J. Ventresca, Inhabited Institutions: Social Interactions and
Organizational Forms in Gouldner’s Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy, 35 THEORY & SOC’Y 213, 213–
15 (2006) (“[Institutions] are composed of people who act, at times in concert and at times in conflict,
within the confines of an immediate working context, and within a larger environment.”).
113. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct already address attorney conduct in the
context of client vulnerability, including 1.8(j) prohibiting “sexual relations with a client” absent a
preexisting, consensual sexual relationship, and 1.8(a) requiring additional protections in business
transactions with clients. Client vulnerability is at the core of these rules. See Michael E. McCabe, Jr.,
Attorney–Client Sex: A Bad Idea That’s Also Unethical, MCCABE L. (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.ipethics
law.com/attorney-client-sex-a-bad-idea-thats-also-unethical/ [https://perma.cc/92W5-SEPT] (“The
traditional ethics-based rationales behind the regulation is a realization that sex is not about sex—it is
about power. Or more precisely, an imbalance of power.”); Texas Lawyers Divided Over ‘Sex with Clients’
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with all of its negative perceptions, rather than as individuals.114 On the
other side of the interaction, a party may unwittingly harbor biases that
affect perceptions of the defendant and his criminality.115
B. The Problems with Self-Defense
Attorney Pengilly, who wore his sidearm to a deposition, claimed that he
openly carries a gun for self-defense.116 Indeed, many attorneys have
concerns about their safety. In 2018, the ABA Journal reported that 88.7%
of attorneys surveyed claimed that they had received threats at some
point,117 and almost 20% had been in the last year.118 A much smaller
percentage—6.4%—had, in fact, been victims of assaults.119
Unsurprisingly, family law practitioners were more likely to report receiving
threats or report that actual assaults had occurred.120 Threats and assaults
occurred most frequently (by far) at the lawyer’s office, with the courthouse
being the second-most-likely location.121 While most lawyers report threats
or assaults primarily from their clients, family lawyers report the majority of

Rule, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Oct. 4, 2010, 1:33 AM), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/
texas/2010/10/04/20101003-Texas-lawyers-divided-over-sex-4374 [https://perma.cc/DQW9-4H
5D] (explaining lawyers can manipulate vulnerable clients into sexual acts).
114. The ABA already concerns itself with the perceptions of prosecutors and the criminal
justice system, as reflected in recent opinions monitoring such issues and reiterating the values
contained in the Model Rules. See ABA Issues New Guidance for Prosecutors Negotiating Misdemeanor
Plea Agreements, A.B.A. (May 9, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-newsarchives/2019/05/aba-issues-new-guidance-for-prosecutors-negotiating-misdemeanor-/
[https://
perma.cc/68AS-LCZ5] (“[E]vidence that . . . methods of negotiating plea bargains have been used in
some jurisdictions that are inconsistent with the duties set forth in the Rules of Professional
Conduct.”); Dennis Rendleman, “There Must Be a Pony in There Somewhere” – New ABA Formal Ethics
Opinion 486, A.B.A. (June 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/publications/
youraba/2019/june-2019/formal-ethics-opinion-486/ [https://perma.cc/3RXK-KABT] (noting
concerns about prosecutors in misdemeanor cases, who often have burdensome caseloads, and whose
actions can be “detrimental to the accused and the public”).
115. See Schubert v. City of Springfield, 589 F.3d 496, 499 (1st Cir. 2009) (discussing how a
police officer stopped a prominent attorney who was concealing a weapon despite having a concealed
carry permit).
116. See Weiss, supra note 1 (quoting Pengilly after the incident).
117. Lorelei Laird, The Job Is Killing Them: Family Lawyers Experience Threats, Violence, A.B.A. J.
(Sept. 1, 2018, 1:10 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_job_is_killing_them_
family_lawyers_experience_threats_violence [https://perma.cc/Y22K-NTM8].
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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these verbal affronts and physical attacks to come from opposing parties.122
Allen Bailey, a solo practitioner in Anchorage, Alaska, and the ABA Section
of Family Law’s liaison to the Commission on Domestic & Sexual Violence,
reports that he “keeps a gun in his desk because of a former client’s exhusband who he suspects stalked him.”123 At the same time, Baily
recommends that other attorneys keep their firearms securely in a desk
drawer, “because carrying it could escalate a situation.”124 Bailey
acknowledges that actual violence against lawyers is “not a weekly or
monthly or annual occurrence.”125 In proposing an ethical rule preventing
lawyers from openly carry firearms to adversarial meetings, it is necessary to
anticipate, and attempt to answer, the objection that lawyers need guns to
defend themselves.126
1.

Overestimating the Usefulness of Carrying a Gun

Lawyers who openly carry firearms to defend themselves may be grossly
overestimating not only the likelihood of an assault, but also the likelihood
that their gun will save them from harm.127 Circumstances would have to
be just right: an attacker without a gun must be several paces away in order
for the defender to have time to draw his weapon and fire preemptively.
Additionally, an attacker who fires a gun from behind, or seclusion, can
easily subdue someone before the victim can fire a defensive shot.
Self-defense requires not only the right weapon and the skill to use it swiftly
and accurately, but also plenty of good luck—a clear shot at the right second,
or the chance to hold a would-be assailant at gunpoint before injuring the
would-be target while summoning law enforcement to the scene. Open
carriers may contend that their visible firearm deters would-be assailants so
that an actual gunfight never occurs. However, this contention rests on
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Admittedly, some who openly carry firearms insist they are doing so for expressive
purposes rather than for self-defense. See Bogus, supra note 15, at 91 (“An organization named
OpenCarry.org is dedicated to trying to make open carry socially acceptable by encouraging gun owners
to carry guns openly more often.”); Horwitz, supra note 105, at 114–15 (suggesting openly carrying a
gun at an anti-gun control rally is expressive conduct); Volokh, supra note 25, at 1521 (“There is indeed
an ‘open carry movement’ of people who deliberately wear guns openly, as a means of trying to
normalize such behavior and of making a statement in favor of gun possession.”).
127. See Wolfgang Stroebe et al., Is It a Dangerous World Out There? The Motivational Bases of
American Gun Ownership, 43 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 1071, 1072 (2017) (“[T]here is no
clear case that gun ownership corresponds with objective risk of attack.”).
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layers of dubious assumptions about how deterrence works subjectively in
the minds of those bent on violence. An assailant who can strike from
behind or seclusion, who has the advantage of surprise, or who is simply
overconfident, is unlikely to restrain a violent impulse merely because the
lawyer wears a holstered sidearm. Instead, the chances that a lawyer’s visible
firearm will escalate a situation from verbal menacing, shoves, or punches
into a gunfight must offset the chances that the lawyer’s gun will somehow
keep the lawyer safe.
Defensive gun use is at the core of the tradeoffs with gun prevalence.128
Wildly disparate statistics, depending on who is talking, characterize the
issue of defensive gun use—that is, how often gun owners, in fact, use their
weapons in self-defense.129 Empirical data that could garner a scholarly
consensus has proved elusive up to now, as researchers disagree about how
often gun owners use their weapons to stop a crime or defend
themselves.130 Some frequently cited statistics come from older,
methodologically flawed surveys of crime victims (representing a narrow
selection of crimes), or gun owners themselves, relying on respondents’ own
opinions about how often their guns have prevented a crime.131 In 2018,
RAND researchers concluded that the true number of defensive gun use
incidents per year is simply unknown, as is the comparative effectiveness of
guns versus other preventative or defensive measures against crime.132
Other factors also distort results in these studies, such as whether a
would-be assailant also had a firearm (guns are presumably most effective
at thwarting unarmed assailants), and whether the set of situations in which
an armed victim has a chance to draw or brandish her firearm merely reflect
128. See JOSEPH BLOCHER & DARRELL A. H. MILLER, THE POSITIVE SECOND AMENDMENT:
RIGHTS, REGULATION, AND THE FUTURE OF HELLER 152–54 (2018) (distinguishing the Heller
Court’s use of self-defense in the context of the Second Amendment); COOK & GOSS, supra note 18,
at 19 (examining interactions that lead to defensive gun uses within society).
129. RAND CORP., THE SCIENCE OF GUN POLICY 8–9 (2018) (ebook); David Hemenway,
Survey Research and Self-Defense Gun Use: An Explanation of Extreme Overestimates, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1430, 1431 (1997); see David Hemenway & Deborah Azrael, The Relative Frequency of
Offensive and Defensive Gun Uses: Results from a National Survey, 15 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 257, 269–70
(2000) (discussing the disparities between three surveys that examined “offensive and defensive gun
use”).
130. See RAND CORP., supra note 129, at 275–80 (describing the widely ranging estimates and
the methodologies used in each published study, most or all of which depend on self-reporting in
surveys).
131. See id. (measuring gun use and conflicting literature); DAVID HEMENWAY, PRIVATE GUNS,
PUBLIC HEALTH 66–69 (2d ed. 2017) (reviewing the leading work in crime surveys).
132. RAND CORP., supra note 129, at 273.
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other advantageous circumstantial factors, such as advance warning of the
intended assault, or bystanders distracting an attacker.133 Empirical
evidence suggests that self-defense with weapons other than firearms occurs
far more often than defensive gun use; for example, there are more reported
uses of baseball bats in successful self-defense than guns.134
An oft-repeated assertion is that guns save lives millions of times per year,
thwarting would-be assaults and murders.135 This unfounded claim appears
to have originated with an article published in the 1990s by pro-gun
researchers Gary Kleck and Marc Getz, that reported a survey they had done
of 5,000 individuals, asking them if they had recently used a gun in selfdefense.136 Kleck and Getz then extrapolated from their sample to the rest
of the United States population, concluding that citizens used guns to
defend themselves more than two million times per year.137 Subsequent
researchers and leading institutions thoroughly debunked their numbers, but
the claim had already become gospel in pro-gun circles and continues to be
a tenet to this day.138 As many subsequent researchers have observed, their
numbers could not possibly be correct, because the numbers they report,
say for example guns thwarting burglaries, do not mathematically
correspond with the number of reported burglaries or attempted
burglaries.139 Current data is available on the Gun Violence Archive,140
which aggregates daily published police reports from thousands of sources.
The Gun Violence Archive reports indicate that reported defensive gun use
133. See id. at 283–84 (comparing the odds of being shot under different circumstances); COOK
& GOSS, supra note 18, at 17–20 (questioning whether guns are an effective method of self-protection);
see also State v. Scott, 819 S.E.2d 116, 120 (S.C. 2018) (recognizing reasonable mistake can justify lethal
force for self-defense).
134. HEMENWAY, supra note 131, at 77.
135. See Evan DeFilippis & Devin Hughes, The Myth Behind Defensive Gun Ownership, POLITICO
(Jan. 14, 2015), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/01/defensive-gun-ownershipmyth-114262 [https://perma.cc/HJJ2-H7RA] (“Despite having nearly no academic support in public
health literature, this myth is the single largest motivation behind gun ownership.”).
136. See HUGH LAFOLLETTE, IN DEFENSE OF GUN CONTROL 104, 137–44 (2018) (detailing
an up-to-date overview of this argument’s origin).
137. See id. at 139–41 (describing the corpus of the Kleck–Getz research).
138. See id. at 168–78 (providing a comprehensive analysis of the problems with the Kleck–
Getz studies). At the time of this writing, LaFollette offers perhaps the most up-to-date discussion
and repudiation of the Kleck–Getz numbers.
139. See DeFilippis & Hughes, supra note 135 (“[T]he 845,000 statistic . . . is simply
mathematically impossible.”).
140. See Gun Violence Archive: Charts and Maps, GUN VIOLENCE ARCHIVE,
https://www.gunviolencearchive.org/ [https://perma.cc/ZZ3Y-MP83] (reporting 4,131 deaths for
the year resulting from guns as of February 8, 2020).
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occurred nationwide just under 1,400 times in 2015, 2,000 times in 2016,
2,100 in 2017, and 1,900 times in 2018.141 Of course, gun owners do not
report every incident of defensive gun use to the police, but even Kleck
himself maintains that they do at least half the time,142 so even doubling
the numbers reported by the Gun Violence Archive would still only yield
3,200–4,200 incidents of guns helping with self-defense per year—a tiny
fraction of the millions of times per year claimed by gun enthusiasts, and a
small number compared to the gun crimes and gun accidents.143 As John
Donahue and his co-authors recently noted:
Even with the enormous stock of guns in the United States, the vast majority
of the time that someone is threatened with violent crime no gun will be
wielded defensively. A five-year study of such violent victimizations in the
United States found that victims reported failing to defend or to threaten the
criminal with a gun 99.2 percent of the time—this in a country with
300 million guns in civilian hands. Adding 16 million permit holders who
often dwell in low-crime areas may not yield many opportunities for effective
defensive use for the roughly 1 percent of Americans who experience a violent
crime in a given year, especially since criminals can attack in ways that preempt
defensive measures.144

2.

The Moral Hazard Problem

Openly carrying a gun for self-defense, in anticipation and preparation
for potential future scenarios, is different from defending oneself
spontaneously as a reaction when attacked. Arming oneself creates moral
hazard problems.145 Emboldened by the sense of security the firearm

141. Past Summary Ledgers, GUN VIOLENCE ARCHIVE, https://www.gunviolencearchive.org/
past-tolls [https://perma.cc/76A6-AN76].
142. See DeFilippis & Hughes, supra note 135 (indicating the flaws in the currently available
statistics).
143. Other commentators have questioned the validity of self-defense on philosophical or
moral grounds. See, e.g., Janine Young Kim, The Rhetoric of Self-Defense, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 261,
263 (2008) (“[T]he moral righteousness of self-defense is probably overstated and does not survive
sustained scrutiny, especially in light of the law’s failure to explicate motive. These uncertainties
naturally lead to problems in the legal understanding of self-defense, which necessarily remains vague
as to the descriptive and moral bases of the concept.”).
144. John J. Donohue et al., Right‐to‐Carry Laws and Violent Crime: A Comprehensive Assessment
Using Panel Data and a State‐Level Synthetic Control Analysis, 16 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 198, 202
(2019) (citation omitted).
145. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 5, 54 (4th ed. 2004)
(explaining moral hazard from an insurance or risk management perspective).
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provides, a person is less risk-averse than they would otherwise be.146
“Moral hazard” simply describes the everyday phenomenon where people
who have taken measures to reduce some risk, or have insured against it,
later offset this benefit by engaging in riskier behavior. A person carrying a
firearm may feel more confident about engaging in such activities as highcrime neighborhoods for dining, shopping, socializing, taking a shortcut,
and so on, so the likelihood of encountering a criminal is higher.147 Guns
can give their owner a false sense of security.148 “The fact that you have a
gun may mean that you do things you shouldn’t be doing: you take chances
you shouldn’t otherwise take; you go to places where it’s really not safe, but
you feel safe.”149
Guns make people feel empowered, but in a toxic way.150 In the 1960s,
Berkowitz and LePage conducted a famous study documenting the
“weapons effect”—study participants who were in a room where guns were
lying around exhibited more aggressiveness and cruelty toward others.151
A 2004 study showed that drivers who had a gun in their car were more
likely to make obscene gestures at other drivers or follow other vehicles too
closely.152 More recently, researchers at Notre Dame University
demonstrated that holding a gun—even a toy gun during the experiment—

146. See Nicholas Moeller, The Second Amendment Beyond the Doorstep: Concealed Carry Post-Heller,
2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1401, 1421 (2014) (“The self-defense argument also presents a substantial moral
hazard problem. Those with weapons may overestimate the self-defense value of their weapons and
behave in riskier ways.” (citation omitted) (citing Beau A. Hill, Go Ahead, Make My Day: Revisiting
Michigan’s Concealed Weapons Law, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 67, 74 (1998))).
147. See id. (“The overstated belief in their safety may cause concealed carriers to place
themselves in more dangerous situations and actually increase the rate of violent conflicts.”).
148. See id. (“For example, a gun owner chooses to walk down an unlit alley knowing he or she
has a gun for protection. The gun owner then runs into a robber that he or she never would have met
had they stayed on the well-lit street.”).
149. Melinda Wenner Moyer, More Guns Do Not Stop More Crimes, Evidence Shows, SCI. AM.
(Oct. 1,
2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/more-guns-do-not-stop-more-crimesevidence-shows/ [https://perma.cc/GS84-8R8T ] (quoting David Hemenway, director of the Harvard
Injury Control Research Center).
150. See Brad J. Bushman, The “Weapons Effect”, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Jan. 18, 2013),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/get-psyched/201301/the-weapons-effect
[https://
perma.cc/WGY2-5YSW] (“A review of 56 published studies reported that the mere sight of weapons
increases aggression in both angry and nonangry individuals.”).
151. See Leonard Berkowitz & Anthony LePage, Weapons As Aggression-Eliciting Stimuli, 7 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 202, 206 (1967) (documenting the “weapons effect”).
152. David Hemenway et al., Is an Armed Society a Polite Society? Guns and Road Rage, 38 ACCIDENT
ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 687,688–90 (2006).
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biased test subjects to perceive that others were armed.153 According to
yet another recent scientific study, merely holding a gun raises the
testosterone level in the blood immediately,154 flooding the system with a
surge of empowerment, ambition, and, if unchecked, raw aggression. Other
writers, of course, have talked about the link between guns and machismo,
that is, toxic masculinity.155 The point here is that we should move beyond
thinking of guns as neutral, inanimate objects that are mere instruments in
the hands of an autonomous actor. Carrying a gun affects the person
carrying it—how the carrier feels, thinks, and the perception of oneself and
others.156 Empowerment is not always a healthy feeling. We have a
colloquial term in our language for unhealthy empowerment feelings—a
“power trip”—but we do not have a word marking the line, or the
qualitative difference, between healthy self-empowerment and the “power
trip” that we all disdain.
If an armed person, including attorneys, approaches an interpersonal
confrontation with elevated bravado, it is easier for the situation to take an
unexpected turn and end badly for one or both parties.157 A gun also makes
one more confident about carrying large sums of cash, valuables, or a client’s
extremely sensitive documents. Conversely, an unarmed person, including
attorneys, may be more likely to exercise caution or avoid conflict, at least
153. Jessica K. Witt & James R. Brockmole, Action Alters Object Identification: Wielding a Gun
Increases the Bias to See Guns, 38 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1159, 1160 (2012); see Adam T. Biggs et
al., Armed and Attentive: Holding a Weapon Can Bias Attentional Priorities in Scene Viewing, 75 ATTENTION
PERCEPTION & PSYCHOPHYSICS 1715, 1721 (2013) (“In summary, under free-viewing conditions,
holding a gun can substantially alter the manner in which attention is allocated within scenes.”); David
DiSalvo, Study: Holding a Gun Influences You to Think Others Are Armed, FORBES (Mar. 12, 2012, 4:35 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/daviddisalvo/2012/03/21/study-holding-a-gun-influences-you-tothink-others-are-armed/#1e8f73ed5e37 [https://perma.cc/JS4E-HDQR] (“[P]eople holding a gun
would tend to assume others are as well.”).
154. Jennifer Klinesmith et al., Guns, Testosterone, and Aggression: An Experimental Test of a
Mediational Hypothesis, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 568, 570 (2006).
155. See, e.g., F. Carson Mencken & Paul Froese, Gun Culture in Action, 66 SOC. PROBS. 3, 4
(2019) (“We find that American gun owners vary greatly in their sense of empowerment from guns;
most dramatically, white respondents who have undergone or fear economic distress tend to derive
self-esteem and moral rectitude from their weapons.”).
156. See Chelsey Kivland, What Guns Do to Our State of Mind, PAC. STANDARD (Apr. 19, 2019),
https://psmag.com/social-justice/how-guns-change-us [https://perma.cc/SHK4-SUSY] (describing
the different cultures of gun possession).
157. See Timothy W. Luke, Counting Up Ar-15s: The Subject of Assault Rifles and the Assault Rifle As
Subject, in THE LIVES OF GUNS 70, 75 (Jonathan Obert et al., eds., 2019) (“Beyond violence, are [people]
fully aware of the multiple American subjectivities shaped by shooting, owning, handling, or
appreciating guns?”).
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at the margins. Disparate outcomes can arise from the margins. Suppose
that openly carrying a gun leads a person to take even a few more risks, be
a little less cautious, or sometimes react more aggressively in their
interactions with others; if so, wearing a gun may make the individual far
less safe than they realize.158 Wearing a sidearm for self-defense creates a
moral hazard problem, so the likelihood of a violent altercation increases.
Moreover, when the rare situation arises when self-defense is necessary, the
armed person is more likely to take risks in that instant—for example, less
likely to retreat without resisting, and less likely to acquiesce, because they
already have a gun in hand. To the extent that an armed individual feels
emboldened, or at least less risk-averse, having the weapon on their person
can end up increasing the likelihood that the armed person will become the
target of an attempted crime.159
Open carry also implicates adverse selection problems.160 Screening
effects among the armed-in-advance group yielded results that skew toward
more fatalities, because those who arm themselves in advance for selfdefense are, at least marginally, more likely to anticipate dangerous
confrontations, or are potentially paranoid, insecure, aggressive, or
vengeful.161
Lawyers with guns are not necessarily the “good guy with a gun.”162 In
December 2017, Erik Graeff, an attorney in Portland, Oregon, fired six
rounds at the office of Terrence Hogan, a lawyer in Beaverton, after a caustic
email exchange about Graeff’s handling of a particular case.163 In
October 2018, a disbarred lawyer in South Carolina shot seven law
158. An adverse selection problem also applies to the more-guns-less-crime collective action
theory, if the people most likely to misuse their firearm in extenuating circumstances (due to their
innate aggressiveness, their values, or their environment) are also more likely to buy weapons or buy
them sooner than others.
159. See Donohue, supra note 144, at 210 (“Presumably, criminals would respond in a similar
fashion, leading them to arm themselves more frequently, attack more harshly, and shoot more quickly
when citizens are more likely to be armed.”).
160. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 145, at 54–55 (explaining adverse selection primarily from
an insurance or risk-management perspective).
161. See Donohue, supra note 144, at 203–07 (discussing possible negative consequences of
legally carrying guns).
162. Eric M. Ruben, Justifying Perceptions in First and Second Amendment Doctrine, 80 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 170 (2017); Joseph Blocher & Darrell A.H. Miller, What Is Gun Control? Direct
Burdens, Incidental Burdens, and the Boundaries of the Second Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 295, 353 (2016).
163. Debra Cassens Weiss, Lawyer Gets Prison Time for Shooting into Another Lawyer’s Office,
A.B.A. J. (Jan. 25, 2019, 9:32 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/lawyer-gets-prisontime-for-shooting-into-another-lawyers-office [https://perma.cc/NEJ8-ESLQ].
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enforcement officers, according to reports.164 The ABA Journal recently
reported an increase in disciplinary actions against lawyers for domestic
violence incidents.165 Numerous court decisions and disciplinary actions
report lawyers resorting to violence166 or engaging in dangerous use of
firearms.167 Are those who openly carry their firearms self-selected for a
164. Debra Cassens Weiss, Disbarred Lawyer Suspected in Shooting of 7 South Carolina Law
Enforcement Officers, A.B.A. J., (Oct. 4, 2018, 9:15 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
suspect_in_south_carolina_officers_shooting_is_a_disbarred_lawyer [https://perma.cc/FBN5-7D
GP].
165. David L. Hudson Jr., Disciplinary Actions Against Lawyers Who Commit Acts of Domestic Violence
Appear to Be on the Rise, A.B.A. J. (Nov. 1, 2015, 2:30 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/
article/disciplinary_actions_against_lawyers_who_commit_acts_of_domestic_violence_a [https://
perma.cc/4X73-LM7W] (“Unfortunately, the legal profession has not been immune to domestic
violence incidents . . . .”); see People v. Knight, 883 P.2d 1055, 1055 (Colo. 1994) (en banc) (reporting
a domestic violence conviction results in six-month suspension).
166. See Cook v. Am. S.S. Co., 134 F.3d 771, 772–74 (6th Cir. 1998) (discussing how a lawyer
struck opposing counsel, resulting in a mistrial and the lawyer being sanctioned); People v. Musick,
960 P.2d 89, 89 (Colo. 1998) (en banc) (stating a domestic violence conviction resulted in a one-yearand-one-day suspension); In re Davidson, 761 N.E.2d 854, 854–55 (Ind. 2002) (per curiam) (describing
when a lawyer assaulted a police officers during his arrest for public intoxication); In re Moore,
665 N.E.2d 40, 40 (Ind. 1996) (per curiam) (disciplining attorney who struck opposing counsel with a
sixty-day suspension); Iowa Supreme Court Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Blessum, 861 N.W.2d 575, 578
(Iowa 2015) (relaying when an attorney engaged in a sexual relationship with a client and eventually
assaulted her); Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Polson, 569 N.W.2d 612, 612–
13 (Iowa 1997) (reviewing a lawyer’s domestic abuse of his wife); In re Sutton, 959 P.2d 904, 904
(Kan. 1998) (per curiam) (describing a lawyer’s altercation with a road construction worker when the
lawyer threw a full soda bottle at him); People v. Pastor, 73 N.Y.S.3d 567, 567–68
(N.Y. App. Div. 2018) (stating a lawyer would beat his girlfriends’ dogs to death after breakups); In re
Burns, 572 N.Y.S.2d 48, 48–50 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (per curiam) (disbarring a lawyer on multiple
grounds, including assault and battery upon another attorney, which required reconstructive surgery
and later surgery to remove scar tissue); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Lucey, 586 N.E.2d 78, 78–
79 (Ohio 1992) (suspending an attorney indefinitely after he was convicted for aggravated assault);
State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Zannotti, 330 P.3d 11, 11–14 (Okla. 2014) (explaining how a lawyer
attacked a former client he was dating); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Perez-Pena, 168 P.3d
408, 415 (Wash. 2007) (en banc) (discussing how a lawyer assaulted his own client during a heated
exchange); Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Robinson, 736 S.E.2d 18, 21 (W. Va. 2012) (explaining how an
attorney beat his own client with a baseball bat).
167. See In re Gelof, No. 112424–B, 2016 WL 3419111, at *2-3 (Del. Jun. 10, 2016) (per curiam)
(reporting a deputy attorney general convinced a security officer to pull a gun on a colleague in the
courthouse witness room as a practical joke); In re Funk, 742 A.2d 851, 851–52 (Del. 1999) (holding
disbarment was warranted by conviction for possession of a firearm by an unlawful drug user); Comm.
on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Ass’n v. Sturgeon, 487 N.W.2d 338, 338–39
(Iowa 1992) (per curiam) (describing how a lawyer threatened to kill persons believed responsible for
his wife’s drug problems, carried loaded weapons without permit, and attempted to break down the
door of the intended victims); In re Brown, 674 So. 2d 243, 244 (La. 1996) (convicting and disbarring
a lawyer who shot and killed her lover during an argument, allegedly accidentally); Att’y Grievance
Comm’n of Md. v. Reno, 83 A.3d 781, 785 (Md. 2014) (showing an attorney gave her former client a
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desire to intimidate others? When Oklahoma changed its laws in 2012 to
allow open carry, gun dealers were thrilled with the new business open carry
would bring; gun shops saw a surge in customers “buying larger weapons,
with longer barrels and with magazines that hold additional rounds, as they
prepare to wear their guns unconcealed.”168 Firmin DeBrabander
commented that the customers wanted to wear “something truly massive
and intimidating.”169
II. ETHICAL RESTRAINTS AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT
In the years since the Supreme Court’s Heller decision, a circuit split has
emerged on the constitutionality of restrictions on carrying firearms,
whether openly or concealed, with most courts upholding various state
restrictions on carrying guns in public. The First,170 Second,171 Third,172
gun despite knowing the state police had recently denied his gun application); Office of Disciplinary
Counsel v. Colburn, 538 N.E.2d 110, 110 (Ohio 1989) (per curiam) (discussing how a lawyer shot his
wife’s former husband); In re Hubatch, 839 N.W.2d 579, 580 (Wis. 2013) (per curiam) (relaying how a
lawyer robbed a credit union with a toy replica gun).
168. DEBRABANDER, supra note 30, at 11 (quoting Manny Fernandez, Oklahomans Prepare for a
New Law that Will Make Guns a Common Sight, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/
2012/10/31/us/oklahoma-prepares-for-open-carry-gun-law.html [https://perma.cc/T9N6-RHHB]).
169. Id. at 12.
170. See Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 676–77 (1st Cir. 2018) (upholding the license-to-carry
regime that included discretionary restrictions on places and purposes for carrying firearms), cert. filed,
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Gould, (No. 18-1272).
171. See Burgess v. Town of Wallingford, 569 F. App’x. 21, 23 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[T]he right to
carry a firearm openly outside the home—is not clearly established law.”); Kachalsky v. Cty. of
Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[W]e do not know . . . the scope of [the Second
Amendment] right beyond the home and the standards for determining when and how the right can
be regulated by a government. This vast ‘terra incognita’ has troubled courts since Heller was
decided.”), cert. denied sub nom. Kachalsky v. Cacace, 569 U.S. 918 (2013).
172. See Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 431 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting “the Second Amendment’s
individual right to bear arms may have some application beyond the home” but “declin[ing] to
definitively declare that the individual right to bear arms for the purpose of self-defense extends beyond
the home”). In Drake, a New Jersey law (N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:54–2.4(d)(1)) requiring concealed
carry applicants to demonstrate a “justifiable need” for self-defense was upheld by the Third Circuit,
as it did not give licensing officials too much discretion. Id. at 427. Applying intermediate scrutiny,
the court upheld the permit regulation, finding that it directly advanced a justifiable government
interest, i.e., to decrease the demonstrated risk and danger posed to the public by persons openly
carrying a handgun. Id. at 440. Although Judge Hardiman stated in the dissent that the “justifiable
need requirement” does not comply with the Second Amendment, he acknowledges that intermediate
scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny is the proper framework. Id. at 457. In addition, Judge Hardiman
joined the majority in dismissing the plaintiff’s prior restraint comparison. Id. at 452. In sum, the
dissent departs from the majority by demanding further evidence must be provided by the state in
order to meet its burden under an intermediate scrutiny analysis. Id. at 453. In sum, the dissent admits
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Fourth,173 Tenth,174 and Eleventh175 Circuits have held that the Second
Amendment does not necessarily guarantee a right to carry a firearm openly
outside the home. The Fifth Circuit has upheld age restrictions on publicly
carrying firearms176 and prohibitions on carrying a gun on postal service
grounds.177
The position of the Ninth Circuit is currently unsettled. In 2016, in Peruta
v. City of San Diego,178 the court, sitting en banc, held that the Second
Amendment does not include a right to concealed carrying of firearms in
public.179 More recently, however, in Young v. Hawaii,180 a three-judge
panel from the Ninth Circuit held that the Second Amendment includes a
right to carry a firearm openly in public for self-defense181 in a challenge to
Hawaii’s open-carry licensing regime.182 The District Court upheld the
statute’s limitations by interpreting Heller narrowly to protect the right of
individuals to bear arms in their homes, which passed intermediate

that the courts should grant some level of deference to the legislature on how they choose to promote
safety but requires a greater showing of necessity. Id. at 457.
173. See Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013) (upholding a Maryland statute
that required a “good and substantial reason” for obtaining a permit to carry a handgun outside the
home); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 470–71 (4th Cir. 2011) (noting that “as we move
outside the home, firearm rights have always been more limited,” as shown by court decisions
upholding bans on concealed carry).
174. See Sandberg v. Englewood, 727 F. App’x. 950, 962 (10th Cir. 2018) (“[It is] not clearly
established that the Second Amendment guaranteed a citizen the right to openly carry a firearm in
public without risk of facing police action.”); Bonidy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 790 F.3d 1121, 1125
(10th Cir. 2015) (holding a federal regulation prohibiting firearms in federal buildings is constitutional);
Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1209 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding the Second Amendment does not
guarantee the right to carry a concealed firearm in public).
175. See GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1244 (11th Cir. 2012) (upholding
state law prohibiting firearms in houses of worship).
176. See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. McCraw, 719 F.3d 338, 350 (5th Cir. 2013) (upholding
a state-mandated age restriction on publicly carrying handguns).
177. See United States v. Dorosan, 350 F. App’x. 874, 875 (5th Cir. 2009) (affirming a
conviction for bringing a handgun onto property belonging to the United States Postal Service).
178. Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
179. Id. at 939; see Constitutional Law—Second Amendment—Ninth Circuit Holds That Concealed Carry
Is Not Protected by the Second Amendment, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1024, 1025–26 (2017) (stating the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the judgments of the district courts prohibiting carrying handguns for self-defense
outside of the home).
180. Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2018), reh’g granted, 915 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2019)
(Mem.).
181. Id. at 1068.
182. Id.; see HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134–9(a) (West 2007) (providing Hawaii’s first “license
to carry” law), declared unconstitutional by Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2018).
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scrutiny.183 The Circuit Court panel reversed, concluding that “keeping
arms” implies a right to carry arms into the home, as this was necessary in
order to “carry them home from the place of purchase and occasionally
move them from storage place to storage place.” 184 The Ninth Circuit has
since granted a rehearing en banc,185 which is still pending.186
The Seventh Circuit has issued decisions going both ways, in certain cases
striking down statutes or ordinances that restrict gun carrying,187 while
more recently upholding laws like the Illinois statute which denies
nonresidents reciprocal concealed carry licenses because their states of
residency did not have licensing standards substantially similar to those of
Illinois.188 The D.C. Circuit, on the other hand, struck down a special-need
requirement for obtaining a concealed carry permit.189 Some state supreme
courts have also upheld bans or limitations on openly carrying firearms,
even under a Second Amendment analysis.190 Particularly relevant to the
topic of this Essay, but predating the changes in Second Amendment
jurisprudence ushered in by Heller, is the 1997 Eighth Circuit decision Gross
v. Norton,191 in which a local city attorney (not a prosecutor) sued,
unsuccessfully, for the right to carry a gun while at work.192 The Eighth
Circuit has not had the opportunity to revisit this issue since Heller.
A legal ethics or disciplinary rule prohibiting lawyers from openly carrying
firearms to adversarial meetings should survive a Second Amendment
183. Young v. Hawaii, 911 F. Supp. 2d 972, 989–91 (D. Haw. 2012), rev’d in part, 896 F.3d 1044
(9th Cir. 2018), reh’g granted, 915 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2019) (Mem.).
184. Young, 896 F.3d at 1052–53.
185. Young v. Hawaii, 915 F.3d 681, 682 (9th Cir. 2019).
186. Id.
187. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The Supreme Court has decided
that the [Second] [A]mendment confers a right to bear arms for self-defense, which is as important
outside the home as inside.”).
188. See Culp v. Raoul, 921 F.3d 646, 648–49 (7th Cir. 2019) (upholding a provision of the
Illinois Firearm Concealed Carry Act “issuing licenses only to nonresidents living in states with
licensing standards substantially similar to those of Illinois”), cert. filed, Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
Culp, (No. 19-487).
189. See Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 664 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (holding
unconstitutional the District of Columbia’s “good reason” law limiting the issuance of concealed carry
licenses to those with a special need for self-defense).
190. See Mich. Gun Owners, Inc. v. Ann Arbor Pub. Schs., 918 N.W.2d 756, 759 (Mich. 2018)
(upholding school district bans on openly carrying firearms against preemption challenge); Norman v.
State, 215 So. 3d 18, 22 (Fla. 2017) (holding Florida’s law prohibiting open carrying of firearms
survived intermediate scrutiny and was constitutional under the Second Amendment).
191. Gross v. Norton, 120 F.3d 877 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).
192. Id. at 878.
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challenge as well. Such a restriction would affect only licensed attorneys,
not the whole population. It would apply to a narrow set of circumstances
or situations, and not trigger criminal penalties for violations,193 but rather
a disciplinary action such as a reprimand or temporary license suspension.
Such a rule would be reasonably tailored to further legitimate state interests,
such as public safety (barring firearms from already-contentious,
confrontational settings) and the integrity and accessibility of the judicial
system.
Existing provisions in the Model Rules or state ethical rules have survived
constitutional challenges, even where the rule in question places a restraint
on a constitutionally protected act, such as speech or association. As Justice
Stewart wrote in his concurrence in In re Sawyer,194 “[o]bedience to ethical
precepts may require abstention from what in other circumstances might be
constitutionally protected speech.”195
To draw on a recent example, the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct
provides a candidate for judicial office “shall not personally solicit or accept
campaign contributions or personally solicit publicly stated support.”196 A
number of states, including Florida, have followed suit and adopted their
version of the model rules imposing additional restrictions on judicial
elections. In 2011, the Florida Bar commenced disciplinary action against
an attorney-candidate for judicial office, Lanell Williams-Yulee, for soliciting
campaign funds from clients and others.197 Williams-Yulee contended that
the restriction on judicial solicitations violated the First Amendment; the
Florida Supreme Court, however, held the rule does not infringe on free
speech because it is “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest.”198 On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed
the state court’s holding, concluding that the prohibition “advances the
State’s compelling interest in preserving public confidence in the integrity
193. See In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550–51 (1968) (holding attorney discipline cases are “of a
quasi-criminal nature”); In re Paschal, 77 U.S. 483, 491–92 (1870) (holding attorney discipline cases are
quasi-criminal proceedings, triggering some due process requirements, even though they are not penal
in nature).
194. In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1959).
195. Id. at 646–47 (Stewart, J., concurring).
196. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5C(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
197. See Fla. Bar v. Williams-Yulee, 138 So. 3d 379, 381–82 (Fla. 2014) (stating the campaign
activities of the attorney-candidate occurred in 2009, but the enforcement action began thereafter, with
a stay of proceedings (pending the outcome of another appeal) delaying the referee’s report until 2011),
aff’d, 575 U.S. 433 (2015).
198. Id. at 383–84, 387.
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of the judiciary, and it does so through means narrowly tailored to avoid
unnecessarily abridging speech.”199 The Court explained that although the
First Amendment fully applies to the petitioner’s speech, there is a
longstanding tradition of protecting the judiciary’s integrity.200 The
decision relied on Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,201 where the Court stated
that protecting the judiciary furthers a vital state interest in safeguarding
“public confidence in the fairness and integrity of the nation’s elected
judges.”202
The Supreme Court has upheld modest ethical-disciplinary restraints on
attorney communication in the context of solicitation and advertising,
despite the First Amendment guarantees of free speech, though categorical
bans on advertising and direct-mail solicitations are constitutionally
impermissible.203 In Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.,204 the Court upheld a
state bar restriction prohibiting targeted direct-mail solicitations for 30 days
following an accident,205 and in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association,206 it
rejected a First Amendment challenge to the prohibition on in-person
solicitation by attorneys.207 A statutory (non-ethical) provision restricting
the advice bankruptcy lawyers could give to clients also withstood a First
Amendment challenge.208 Similarly, the Supreme Court has upheld
attorneys’ mandatory membership in a state bar in the face of challenges
based on freedom of association.209
To summarize the points in this section, an ethical rule prohibiting
lawyers from openly carrying firearms to certain representation-related
199. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 444 (2015).
200. Id. at 447–48.
201. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
202. Id. at 889 (quoting Brief for Conference of Chief Justices as Amicus Curiae 4, 11).
203. See Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 470–71 (1988) (upholding a complete ban
against a lawyer’s use of direct mail solicitations for professional employment); Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 655 (1985) (upholding advertising
restrictions); In re R. M. J., 455 U.S. 191, 207 (1982) (upholding restrictions on advertising and direct
mail solicitations); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 354, 382 (1977) (upholding advertising with
listed legal fees per type of matter).
204. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
205. Id. at 620.
206. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
207. Id. at 459.
208. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 239 (2010).
209. See Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 823, 843 (1961) (declaring a state supreme court
ruling requiring a lawyer “be an enrolled dues-paying member of the State Bar did not abridge his rights
of freedom of associations”); Kaimowitz v. Fla. Bar, 996 F.2d 1151, 1153–54 (11th Cir. 1993)
(upholding a similar ruling).
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meetings would not infringe on lawyers’ Second Amendment rights any
more than other longstanding rules modestly infringe on lawyers’ First
Amendment rights. Courts have often upheld the latter in the face of
repeated constitutional challenges. It is reasonable to expect that the rule
proposed here would also survive constitutional scrutiny by the courts,
because it stands at the periphery of the Second Amendment’s protections.
III. OTHER CONTEXT-RELATED FIREARM PROHIBITIONS
Even in states permitting open carry, federal statutes sanction bringing a
gun to certain events, besides the well-known place prohibitions (gun-free
zones). The implication is that banning guns at depositions and other
adversarial meetings would be consistent with other policy judgments made
by Congress where guns make certain situations more dangerous or raise
the potential for unlawful acts in some way (perhaps by introducing an
element of coercion, excessive risk-taking, or hostility to authorities). This
Part will first explore, albeit very briefly, some longstanding situational or
event-based restrictions on carrying firearms that could be relevant, that is,
analogous to a situational restraint on lawyers, such as making it an ethical
violation to carry a firearm to a deposition or settlement conference openly.
This Part then turns to the issue of the location-based restriction on
firearms, which is most relevant for lawyers and litigation—guns in the
courthouse—which has become a controversial and rapidly-changing area
in the last few years. The traditional courthouse bans on guns, which still
apply in federal courts, could supply two points related to the ethical rule
proposed here. First, many of the same policy concerns giving rise to
courthouse gun prohibitions would apply to court-related (litigation-related)
adversarial meetings that apply outside the courthouse; and second, as state
legislatures increasingly compel courts to permit guns in court buildings,
ethical guidance for litigators becomes more essential and urgent.
A. Situational or Event Prohibitions
The majority opinion in Heller included a crucial caveat:
Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the
full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken
to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by
felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in
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sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing
conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.210

Some of these “presumptively lawful,”211 longstanding prohibitions are in
the federal statutes that impose sentencing enhancements or gradation
increases in offense level for using guns in certain crimes. For example,
18 U.S.C. § 924 is a federal firearms statute that imposes penalties on the
illegal use of firearms.212 Section (c)(1)(A)(i) imposes a term of
imprisonment of not less than five years for using or carrying a firearm
during or in furtherance of any crime of violence for which a person could
be prosecuted.213 In other words, this violation is triggered when the
perpetrator commits a predicate offense (i.e., crime of violence or drugrelated crime) or when the perpetrator possesses a firearm in furtherance of
a predicate offense.214
If the firearm carrier brandishes the weapon, the sentence is a minimum
of seven years, and if the firearm discharges, the sentence is a minimum of
ten years.215 The statute defines “crime of violence” to mean a felony that:
(A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person or property of another, or
(B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the
person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the
offense.216

The statute also explains that the term “brandish” means to “display all
or part of the firearm, or otherwise make the presence of the firearm known
to another person, in order to intimidate that person,” even if the person
does not see the gun.217 First-time offenders are subject to, at the least, a
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008).
Id. at 627 n.26.
18 U.S.C. § 924 (2018).
Id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i).
See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41412, FEDERAL MANDATORY
MINIMUM SENTENCING: THE 18 U.S.C. 924(C) TACK-ON IN CASES INVOLVING DRUGS OR
VIOLENCE 5 (2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41412.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YGU-DU92]
(stating federal courts have interpreted “possession” to include either constructive or actual
possession).
215. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii).
216. Id. § 924(c)(3). But see United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2336 (2019) (holding
§ 924(c)(3)(B) to be unconstitutionally vague, though the remainder of the statute remains in force).
217. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(4).
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flat five-year sentence,218 whereas subsequent offenders receive twenty-five
years.219 Violators of this provision are not entitled to probation.220
Penalties related to crimes of violence or drug-related offenses include the
suspension or revocation of a license along with civil penalties, such as a
maximum fine of $2,500.221
Instances when a lawyer exposes a handgun in a deposition or during any
court proceeding, may or may not be a “crime of violence,” as it is a
threatened use of physical force against another person, but this depends on
context and circumstances. Lawyers who brandish their weapons to
opposing counsel to intimidate can be subject to a minimum of seven years
under the federal statute. A court must find that there is enough evidence

218. Id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i).
(A) Except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is otherwise provided by this
subsection or by any other provision of law, any person who, during and in relation to any
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime (including a crime of violence or drug trafficking
crime that provides for an enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or
dangerous weapon or device) for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United
States, uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm,
shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking
crime—
(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years[.]
Id.
219. Id. § 924(c)(1)(B)–(C):
(B) If the firearm possessed by a person convicted of a violation of this subsection—
(i) is a short-barreled rifle, short-barreled shotgun, or semiautomatic assault weapon, the
person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years; or
(ii) is a machinegun or a destructive device, or is equipped with a firearm silencer or
firearm muffler, the person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less
than 30 years.
(C) In the case of a violation of this subsection that occurs after a prior conviction under this
subsection has become final, the person shall—
(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years; and
(ii) if the firearm involved is a machinegun or a destructive device, or is equipped with a
firearm silencer or firearm muffler, be sentenced to imprisonment for life.
Id.
220. Id. § 924(c)(1)(D)(i).
221. Id. § 924(p)(1)(A)(i)–(ii).
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to show “active employment of the firearm.”222 The lawyer must be
actively using the firearm as a means to complete the violent crime. As a
result, lawyers who use these kinds of intimidation tactics can face a variety
of civil penalties and up to a decade in prison.223
B. Location-based Prohibitions Related to Lawyering
As mentioned already, Heller specifically mentioned longstanding
prohibitions on guns in “government buildings” as presumptively lawful,224
suggesting there is no clear constitutional problem with barring guns from
specific places, like courtrooms. Most states categorically prohibit guns in
courtrooms, but there is a new trend toward loosening the longstanding
courthouse gun bans. Out of concern for safety and security, however,
legislative actions expanding gun rights in courtrooms have encountered
resistance.225 The new trend toward loosening the longstanding
courthouse gun bans is a push coming from legislatures, not from the
judiciary.226 The judiciary has resisted this trend. For example, Wisconsin
judges, in a statement supporting their ban on concealed weapons from a
county courthouse stated that “[t]he first step in fulfilling that obligation,
and in assessing safety and security threats in a courtroom, is for judges and
law enforcement to be aware of who is carrying a weapon during a
proceeding.”227 Similarly, the Iowa Supreme Court banned guns in
courthouses statewide with the justification that “[w]hen Iowans believe
their courthouses and court facilities are not safe, the integrity of the entire
222. Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 144 (1995), superseded by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)
(1998), as recognized in, Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016).
223. See Quick Facts: Section 924(c) Firearms Offenses, U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION,
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/quick-facts/Quick_Facts_
Section_924c_Offenders.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HFJ-C5ZZ] (listing punishments for “all offenders
convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)”).
224. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27, 627 n.26 (2008).
225. See Gersham, supra note 22 (“Security fears were underscored by eruptions of violence
inside and outside courthouses in recent years, including shooting incidents in Delaware, Texas and
South Carolina, in which gunmen opened fire at estranged relatives and, in an attack near Dallas, in
which a prosecutor was targeted.”).
226. See Brendan O’Brien, Wisconsin Judges Are Wrong to Bar Guns From Court, Prosecutor Says,
REUTERS (June 19, 2012, 7:51 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-guns-courthouse/
wisconsin-judges-are-wrong-to-bar-guns-from-court-prosecutor-says-idUSBRE85J01G20120620
[https://perma.cc/EQ7E-Q4H5] (“A Wisconsin prosecutor asked the state’s highest court on
Tuesday to dismiss orders by local judges barring gun-toting attorneys from bringing concealed
weapons into courtrooms.”).
227. Id.
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justice process is compromised and undermined.”228 The significant aspect
of safety and security underlying both statements is the perception of the
justice process.229
Court buildings include many areas besides courtrooms where
participants in litigation interact with one another, whether in pre-planned
meetings in auxiliary conference rooms, or happenstance encounters in
hallways, lobbies, lunchrooms, elevators, and restrooms. Permitting guns in
these areas expands the potential situations where visibly armed attorneys
could meet opposing parties and counsel, witnesses, jurors, and court staff.
At its 2019 Annual Meeting, the American Bar Association’s House of
Delegates passed, without opposition, Resolution 19A105—“Guns in
Courtrooms.”230 The ABA’s Standing Committee on Gun Violence
submitted the resolution, and the Criminal Justice Section, the Civil Rights
and Social Justice Section, the Commission on Domestic and Sexual
Violence, and the Judicial Division co-sponsored it.231 The Resolution
states:
RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association urges federal, state, local,
territorial, and tribal courts and legislatures to develop policies and protocols
as to who may carry firearms in courthouses, courtrooms, and judicial centers
that allow only those persons necessary to ensure security, including approved
safety officers, judges, and court personnel, have weapons in the courthouse,

228. Gersham, supra note 22.
229. This focus on the perception of safety and security is distinguishable from the argument
of whether (everyone or select people in the proceedings) carrying guns makes the room or building
safe. The perception of safety and security in the courthouse affects the perception of the justice process.
While some courts have expressed concern about the actual dangers presented by the presence of
firearms in a courthouse, the Iowa Supreme Court statement broadens this concern to the effects of
guns on the administration of justice. Thus, the real issue is how people’s perception of safety affects
the justice process. The argument that guns make people safer is distinguishable and separate from
this issue of how armed participants, parties, witnesses, or interested observers in courthouse or
courtroom proceedings impact people’s perceptions of safety and the justice process. The argument,
however true or not, that guns make people safer, fails to address the issue of the perception of safety
and security as it affects the legitimacy of the justice process.
230. ABA Standing Comm. on Gun Violence, Res. 19A105 – Guns in Courtrooms (Aug. 2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_interest/gun_violence/policy/19A105/
[https://
perma.cc/6DJC-3MHZ]; see Lorelei Laird, Limit Guns in Courthouses and Train Those Who Use Them, ABA
House of Delegates Urges, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 12, 2019, 5:53 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
limit-guns-in-courthouses-and-train-those-who-use-them-aba-house-of-delegates-urges
[https://
perma.cc/PQG5-ZJRX] (providing a report of the presentation and discussion at the House of
Delegates).
231. Laird, supra note 230.
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courtroom, or judicial center, including common areas within the buildings as
well as the grounds immediately adjacent to the justice complex, and that
require training for those who are permitted to carry firearms.232

Resolution 19A105 thus seeks to (1) restrict the possession of firearms in
and around buildings that contain courtrooms to only a limited group of
individuals necessary for security and (2) require firearm safety training for
anyone permitted to carry guns anywhere on such premises.233 The Report
accompanying Resolution 19A105 observes, “[c]ourtroom proceedings may
sometimes become contentious and emotional, creating concerns for the
safety of the litigants, as well as judges, lawyers, support staff, and law
enforcement. Increasingly there have been occurrences where violence has
erupted and firearms are used inside and outside of the courtroom.”234 It
then goes on to delineate the dramatic increase in threats and gun violence
in and at courthouses in recent years—the number of incidents reported by
the U.S. Marshals Service has doubled between 2003 and 2011.235 A
thoughtful discussion of the Heller decision and its progeny follows; the
Report notes that “Neither Heller nor McDonald would prohibit restrictions
on carrying firearms in to buildings which house court facilities or the
grounds immediately surrounding the courtroom facilities,”236 and adds
that the Tenth Circuit explicitly upheld bans on guns in federal facilities.237
The ABA Report laments the new trend in state legislatures to permit
firearms in courthouses, or even courtrooms, mentioning egregious
examples from Georgia, Iowa, and Mississippi.238 Courtrooms are
traditionally sacrosanct, and violence in courtrooms is particularly upsetting,
but the courtrooms themselves are not the most dangerous places in the
courthouse, as the report notes that “the immediate areas surrounding the
court facility pose the greatest danger.”239 The reason has to do with the
presence or absence of trained personnel: “Trained courtroom safety
officers, judges and court personnel provide protection for the court
personnel and litigants while inside the courtroom. However, once in the
hallways or elevators or parking lots, those who were constrained within the
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

ABA Standing Comm. on Gun Violence, supra note 230.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Bonidy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 790 F.3d 1121 (10th Cir. 2015)).
Id.
Id.
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courtroom now are free to act out their hostilities.”240 Furthermore, while
most state judges may prohibit guns from their courtroom, in some states,
the judge’s authority ends at the courtroom door even though the threat
does not.241 In light of such limitations on judges that prevent them from
prohibiting guns throughout the courthouse, the ABA thus advocates for a
comprehensive resolution, starting with state legislatures.242 Because the
dangers do not cease at the courtroom door and because allowing guns on
the premises but not in a courtroom creates other issues, including the risk
that a gun owner may pass the gun off to a family member with less training,
the resolution advocates for prohibiting guns from the entire grounds,
allowing only a very specific few (judges, security, and courtroom personnel)
permission to carry after proper training.243
Of special relevance for the proposal discussed in this Essay—lawyers
attending adversarial meetings related to litigation, outside of the trial
itself—the report urges that states adopt gun restrictions for the various
conference rooms and meeting rooms in courthouses. “These limits should
apply to the courtroom, judges’ chambers, witness rooms, jury deliberation
rooms, attorney conference rooms, prisoner holding cells, and similar
locations except where trained courtroom safety officers, judges and court
personnel possess such firearms. Such limitations have worked with federal
facilities.”244
Courtrooms and courthouses are notoriously stressful places, especially
for the nonlawyers who find themselves there.245 Participants and
observers in litigation often hear cases that recount threats and acts of
violence, and the evidence presented in these cases can produce anxiety and
discomfort.246 Of course, the adversarial nature of the trial process
240. Id.
241. See id. (stating there is no uniformity when it comes to areas in which judges may limit the
possession of firearms).
242. Id.
243. Id. But see K. L. McIff, Weapon-Free Courthouses and the Gun Locker Dilemma, UTAH B.J., June–
July 2003, at 10 (“[T]he natural consequence of [gun lockers] would be to invite the presence of guns,
especially in the older courthouses of rural Utah.”).
244. ABA Standing Comm. on Gun Violence, supra note 230.
245. See, e.g., Gersham, supra note 22 (“‘Courthouses can be very emotionally charged places,’
said Bill Raftery, a senior analyst with the National Center for State Courts. ‘It’s a public building, but
it’s a place that has prisoners being transported and highly charged emotional cases and situations.’”).
246. See Monica K. Miller et. al., Addressing the Problem of Courtroom Stress, JUDICATURE, Sept.–
Oct. 2007, at 60 (“Courtrooms can be stressful places; legal actors and courthouse visitors experience
occasional acts of violence, gruesome trial evidence, and a number of daily, low-level stressors. Each
of these sources has the potential to affect both judges and jurors.”).
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contributes to this stress.247 Openly carried firearms in non-judicial rooms
of a courthouse can affect the judges who work in the building, many of
whom already have legitimate concerns about their safety, and the presence
of firearms makes their workplace environment feel less secure.248 There
is also an escalation effect at work: there are increasing demands by
prosecutors to have permission to carry guns in courtrooms because the
other areas of the building “are not secured and are not even off-limits to
weapons.”249 Openly carried guns in non-judicial areas of the building thus
ratchets up their perception of insecurity and the stress associated with the
courthouse.
An individual’s perceptions of the system and of the peril presented by
firearms will influence the effect of seeing someone carrying a gun in the
courthouse. Even well-meaning judges and prosecutors can intimidate
others by virtue of having a gun;250 their position of authority further
complicates this problem. It is shortsighted to believe that the dangers
posed within a courtroom that form the basis of courtroom gun bans stop
at the courtroom doors. The adversarial nature of courtroom proceedings
exists at all stages of litigation and transactional legal matters. The
interactions between parties are adversarial in depositions, settlement
negotiations, discussing plea agreements, mediation, etc. Expanding open
and concealed carry to non-judicial areas makes judges and others, who

247. Id. at 67–68.
248. See id. at 65 (“Violence directed at judges and their families represents a growing
phenomenon and is a source of stress.”); see also Lauren Pack & Rick McCrabb, Guns in Court: Local
Judges, Lawyers Say Ohio Shooting Example of Why They Carry, J.-NEWS (Aug. 28, 2017),
https://www.journal-news.com/news/guns-court-local-judges-lawyers-say-ohio-shooting-examplewhy-they-carry/4etwoZMFNHTDYo8vJ1eoQM/# [https://perma.cc/689X-34SE] (“Lawyers and
judges in Butler and Warren counties said threats against them aren’t uncommon given . . . the
sometimes passionate nature of those cases.”).
249. O’Brien, supra note 226. For example, one Ohio judge admitted “I am not sure carrying a
firearm actually makes me any safer . . . . It does make me feel safer, sometimes,” and a prosecutor
officed in the same building, but not in the secure court wing, justified being armed in his office because
“there’s only so much the police can do.” Pack & McCrabb, supra note 247.
250. See Volokh, supra note 25, at 1521 (discussing the social intimidation and fear that results
when someone openly carries a gun). The intent of the attorney or judge should be irrelevant in
establishing a Model Rule prohibiting guns in adversarial meetings. For example, misconduct does not
require an intent to intimidate to warrant discipline. Maryland disciplined a lawyer for calling the
prosecution’s star witness in his client’s case and claiming to be a police officer with a warrant to arrest
the witness. See Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Smith, 950 A.2d 101, 118–19 (Md. App. 2008)
(holding irrelevant whether the lawyer intended to intimidate the witness because the apparent attempt
to discourage the witness from appearing and testifying violated Rules 8.4(a) through (d)).
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already feel threatened, feel even less safe.251 This heightened sense of
insecurity increases the demand for more carry rights inside courtrooms.252
Given the concerns for safety, security, the administration of justice, and the
perceptions of the justice process, the trend of some states expanding their
courtroom carry laws253 is certainly relevant to the question of lawyers
themselves openly carrying firearms.
Texas provides a high-profile example of the recent nationwide trend.
Starting in 2007, Texas permitted judges, prosecutors, and certain other local
government lawyers to carry guns in courtrooms254 if the judge or
government lawyer had a license to carry under the statutory concealed carry
statute.255 At the time, the prohibition for courtroom carry remained for
all other license holders.256 Legislators also expanded where an “active
judicial officer”257 may lawfully carry to include places otherwise prohibited
to licensees, such bars, hospitals, civil commitment facilities, and rooms
where meetings of a governmental entity are held, and effective notice

251. Our Survey: 1 in 4 Judges Carries a Gun, NAT’L JUD. C. (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.judges.
org/1_in_4/ [https://perma.cc/4BSG-G2DV].
252. See generally Chuck Weller, What Judges Should Know About Court-Related Violence, JUDGES’ J.,
July 1, 2014, at 28 (“All judges are concerned about court-related violence.”).
253. See Gersham, supra note 22 (“Since 2013, more than a dozen mostly Republican-led states
have considered measures easing courthouse restrictions, although generally guns are still banned inside
individual courtrooms.”); William E. Raftery, Guns in Court, JUDICATURE, May 2017, at 5 (“The last
several years have seen a reexamination of laws that permit firearms in courthouses . . . . [f]or the most
part, such efforts have been designed to expand the ability of individuals to carry guns into courthouses,
and, in some instances, directly into courtrooms.”).
254. The formal request for an opinion letter sent by former District Attorney for Harris
County, Kenneth Magidson, presents a concise yet thorough history of gun laws affecting Texas
courtrooms. Unfortunately, the Attorney General’s archive reflects that the opinion request RQ-0734GA was withdrawn so the Attorney General did not issue an opinion on some of the prescient
questions of law in the letter. Letter from Kenneth Magidson, Dist. Attorney, to Greg Abbott, Tex.
Att’y. Gen. (Aug. 7, 2008). Kenneth Magidson voiced “significant concerns with regard to the level of
training that should be required in order to permit prosecutors to safely carry firearms in the volatile
environment of a criminal courthouse.” Clay Robison, Harris County DA Aims for Limits on Aides’ Guns
in Court, HOUS. CHRON. (Aug. 26, 2008, 5:30 AM), https://www.chron.com/news/houstontexas/article/Harris-County-DA-aims-for-limits-on-aides-guns-1753163.php [https://perma.cc/DR
G6-LQEL].
255. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.15(a).
256. See 20 Tex. Jur. 3d Criminal Law: Offenses Against Public Health § 27 (2019) (interpreting
the statutory prohibitions on weapons in particular places as not applying to judges, government
attorneys, or bailiffs licensed to carry).
257. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.201(a)(1)(A)–(C) (broadly defined as judges from the
highest court down to justice and municipal courts).
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provides that guns prohibited.258 Furthermore, the law exempted judges
and (assistant) district attorneys from proficiency certification requirements
for obtaining and renewing a gun license, permitting instead submission of
a sworn statement from a handgun proficiency instructor indicating the
licensee demonstrated proficiency.259
In 2015, following the trend in other states, the Texas legislature imposed
a statutory penalty for improperly prohibiting licensed carry; this change
necessitated a clarification of the definition of “courthouse.”260 Concerned
that their county or municipality might be exposed to fines by flatly
prohibiting courthouse carry, some district attorneys sought opinions from
the state Attorney General on how to interpret, among other things, the
meaning of “on the premises of any government court or offices utilized by
the court.”261 One letter requested clarification because their “[c]ourthouse
building contains courtrooms, offices for district judges, offices for court
personnel, the District Clerk, the County Treasurer, facilities for the grand
jury, and a portion of the probation department.”262 The Attorney General,
Ken Paxton, addressed the question by construing “46.03(a)(3) to
encompass only government courtrooms and those offices essential to the
operation of the government court.”263 Paxton went further, reminding
recipients of the penalties for incorrectly designating public spaces as gunfree areas.264 Fines and litigation could result if any courthouse prohibited
guns in an area deemed not “essential” to the court. Several counties
resisted the attorney general’s opinion out of concern for the security risks,
including where
“courtroom doors are made out of glass and that’s not going to stop a
bullet . . . .” Courtrooms . . . are the scene of emotionally charged cases that

258. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.035(h-1) (providing notable regulations as Model Rules
of Professional Conduct and Code of Judicial Conduct extend to the personal lives of lawyers and
judges).
259. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.1882(a).
260. See Certain Offenses Relating to Carrying Concealed Handguns on Property Owned or
Leased by a Governmental Entity; Providing a Civil Penalty, 84th Leg., R.S., ch. 593, § 3,
sec. 411.209(a), 2015 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2000, 2000–01 (codified at TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 411.209) (conforming to open carry laws).
261. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.03(a)(3).
262. Letter from Allison Palmer, Dist. Attorney, to Ken Paxton, Tex. Att’y Gen. (July 14, 2015).
263. Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. KP-0047 (2015).
264. Id.
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have been known to erupt in violence: “people tried for murder, molesting
children, victim’s families and people involved in family law disputes.”265

The City of Austin lost its attempt to defy the attorney general’s
interpretation of the law expanding guns in courthouses.266 Further
complicating the situation was the 2015 legislative amendment that changed
the baseline for licensees from a “concealed carry license” (CHL) to a
“license to carry,” thus permitting licensees to openly carry as long as the
licensee holstered the gun at the shoulder or belt.267 These amendments
generally supplanted open carry rights where a licensee previously had been
permitted to carry with a CHL.268
The general trend towards permitting more guns in courthouses is
occurring outside of Texas as well, though not always with as much
politicized fanfare.269 Some states only permit courtroom gun prohibitions
if specified screening measures are in place.270 Many states permit some
form of carry in the non-judicial areas of the courthouse. Texas, Alaska,
Minnesota, and Mississippi permit openly carrying firearms in courthouses
but not in courtrooms themselves.271 In at least Arkansas and Kansas,
265. Jordan Michaels, Texas AG Sues a Houston County to Allow Concealed Firearms on Courthouse
Premises, GUNS AM. DIG. (Sept. 5. 2016), https://www.gunsamerica.com/digest/texas-ag-sues-ahouston-county-to-allow-concealed-firearms-on-courthouse-premises/ [https://perma.cc/QQT7ANL7].
266. Paxton v. City of Austin, et al., No. D-1-GN-16-003340 (261st Dist. Ct., Travis County,
Tex. Jan. 17, 2019).
267. See Tex. H.B. 910, 84th Leg., R.S. (2015) (using specific language to describe how the
“court may suspend a license to carry a handgun issued” under the Government Code) (emphasis added)).
268. See Anna M. Tinsley, Open Carry Is the Law of the Land in Texas As of Jan. 1, FORT WORTH
STAR-TELEGRAM (Dec. 26, 2015, 7:31 PM), https://www.star-telegram.com/news/politicsgovernment/article51727345.html [https://perma.cc/XP7B-VX9Z] (“[A]nywhere you can go with a
concealed handgun you can openly carry.”).
269. See, e.g., Holcomb v. McCraw, 262 F. Supp. 3d 437, 441 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (introducing a
§ 1983 action against arresting officers who arrested gun rights activists for criminal trespass while
advocating for openly carrying firearms in public by displaying fake guns at Texas State Capitol).
270. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-12-214(4)(a)–(c) (West 2013). But see Standing Order
Regarding Firearms and Other Deadly Weapons, No. 2013-03 (Colo 12th Dist. Ct. 2013) (“[C]ourts
have the inherit power to regulate their own environment to provide for the safe, effective
administrative of justice . . . .”).
271. Alaska permits carrying guns in non-judicial areas if more than just the court system and
justice-related agencies occupy the courthouse building. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.61.220(a)(4)(B)(ii)
(West 2007). Texas permits licensed open carry in non-judicial areas. Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. KP0047 (2015). Minnesota permits carrying guns if the carrier is licensed and has consent from the sheriff.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.66(1g)(b)(2), (4) (West 2009). In Mississippi, judges have no authority to
prohibit guns beyond his or her courtroom, however, the sheriff may disallow open carry in the
courthouse for safety and security purposes. Miss. Att’y Gen. Op. 2013-00114 (2013).
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concealed carrying, but not open carry, is permissible in non-judicial areas
of courthouses.272 The state-by-state variations can be bewildering: in
Michigan, for example, statutory law permits licensed concealed carry in a
courthouse,273 but a subsequent administrative order from the Michigan
Supreme Court barred firearms from courthouses in that state.274 Missouri
law prohibits guns in courthouses that are solely occupied by specific courts,
but otherwise protects judicial areas; however, Missouri permits a “general
assembly, supreme court, county or municipality” the option to prohibit
concealed carry by permit holders in buildings owned or leased by
the entity.275 In addition, at least eleven states carve out explicit exceptions
to permit some or all judges to carry guns in court: Arkansas,276
Georgia,277 Louisiana,278 Missouri,279 North Carolina,280 Ohio,281

272. Arkansas permits licensed concealed carry except in a courtroom. ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 5-73-122(a)(3)(D)(i) (West 2017). Kansas permits concealed carry in public areas unless there are
“adequate security measures to ensure that no weapons are permitted to be carried into such public
area and the public area is conspicuously posted with either permanent or temporary signage approved
by the governing body.” KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7c20(a) (2008); see Kan. Att’y. Gen. Op. No. 20153 (2015) (requiring adequate security measures to ensure no weapons are permitted in certain public
places); Kan. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 2013-14 (2013) (describing the locations where carrying is not
permitted).
273. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.234d(1)(c), (2)(c) (West 2004).
274. See Security Policies for Court Facilities, No. 2001–1 (Mich. 2001) (barring guns from
courthouses); Mich. Gun Owners, Inc. v. Ann Arbor Pub. Schs., 897 N.W.2d 768, 775 n.8
(Mich. Ct. App. 2016) (“Despite that MCL 750.234d(2)(c) permits concealed weapon holders to carry
concealed weapons in ‘[a] court,’ our Supreme Court has promulgated an administrative order barring
the presence of all weapons in court facilities unless approved by the chief judge.”), aff’d, 918 N.W.2d
756 (Mich. 2018).
275. MO. ANN. STAT. § 571.107(4), (6) (West 2018).
276. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-122(a)(3)(E) (West 2017) (permitting the carrying of a firearm
in a public building “[i]f the person has a license to carry a concealed handgun . . . , is a justice of the
Supreme Court or a judge on the Court of Appeals, and is carrying a concealed handgun in the Arkansas
Justice Building.”).
277. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-130(a)(12)–(12.2) (West 2015) (providing exceptions for
current and retired court employees).
278. See LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1379.3(N)(3) (2016) (“[A] judge may carry such a weapon in his
own courtroom.”).
279. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 571.030(2)(10) (West 2018) (excepting government attorneys and
court-appointed persons who have “completed the firearms safety training course”).
280. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-269(b)(4d) (West 2014) (“The judge or magistrate shall
secure the weapon in a locked compartment when the weapon is not on the person of the judge or
magistrate[.]”).
281. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.123(C), (E) (West 2006) (allowing listed court
personnel to carry firearms in a courthouse).
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Oklahoma,282 South Carolina,283 Texas,284 Utah,285 and Wisconsin.286
Most of the states also listed expressly exclude peace officers (to varying
extents) from courthouse gun prohibitions, although Arkansas287 and
South Carolina288 expressly except officers appearing as witnesses from this
exclusion. Prosecutors may also carry guns into court in a few states:
Georgia,289 Kansas,290 Missouri,291 North Carolina,292 and Wisconsin293
permit prosecutors to have concealed firearms with them in court, but not
other attorneys or parties. Some states explicitly exclude parking lots from
gun bans.294
The trend of permitting guns in and around courthouses overlaps with
the concerns outlined here about lawyers openly carrying firearms. There is
an expanded number of places where lawyers could carry firearms when
282. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1277(G)(2), (4) (West 2018) (granting an exception “when
acting in the course and scope of employment within the courthouse”); id. § 1272(A)(4) (requiring a
valid handgun license and maintenance of an Administrative Director of the Courts list).
283. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-31-240 (2007) (listing persons who may carry a concealed firearm
anywhere within the State).
284. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.035(h-1) (providing a defense to prosecution if the
carrier is a judge, active judicial officer, or prosecutor).
285. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-2-203(1) (West 2009) (“Every court of record may make
rules . . . for its own government and the government of its officers . . . .”).
286. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 175.60(16)(b)(2) (West 2016) (allowing a judge who is a licensee to
carry a weapon).
287. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-122(e) (West 2017) (“An off-duty law enforcement officer
may not carry a firearm into a courtroom if the off-duty law enforcement officer is a party to or a
witness . . . .”).
288. See Courtroom Security Order, No. 2001-07-10-01 (S.C. 2001) (“Concealed or
unconcealed weapons are prohibited in the courtroom except when carried by law enforcement
officers . . . .”).
289. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-130(a)(5) (West 2015) (allowing district attorneys and other
government employees to carry firearms in courtrooms).
290. See Kan. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 2009-20 (2009) (clarifying exception allowing district and
other state attorneys to carry firearms in a courtroom unless prohibited by the chief judge of the district
where requisite security measures are in place); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7c20(h) (West 2008) (exempting
prosecutors from the prohibition against unauthorized possession of a firearm in county courthouses).
291. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 571.030(2)(10) (West 2018) (excepting prosecuting attorneys that
have completed the required safety training course).
292. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-269(b)(4a) (West 2014) (“[A] district attorney may carry a
concealed weapon while in a courtroom . . . .”).
293. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 175.60(16)(b)(3) (West 2016) (permitting concealed carry of a
weapon in a courthouse).
294. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6309(g) (West 2012) (defining a “courthouse” to exclude
parking structures); MO. ANN. STAT. § 571.107(1)(4) (West 2018) (excluding parking lots from the
definition of “courthouse”); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-269.4(6) (West 2014) (providing separate
guidelines for parking lots).
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meeting with opposing parties, jurors, and witnesses—the hallways,
bathrooms, and auxiliary meeting rooms in courthouse facilities. In
addition, the awareness that a hostile opposing party could bring a firearm
(say, in a marital dissolution or child custody matter) to areas within the
courthouse may induce more lawyers, or their staff or clients, to openly carry
weapons as a preemptive measure. The expansion of gun-carrying rights in
areas where litigation participants will encounter one another merely
heightens the urgency of a clear ethical rule for lawyers in this regard.
IV. CONCLUSION
The report accompanying ABA Resolution 19A105 summed up the
situation well: “In a society that has become increasing volatile and where
civility has diminished, the time has come for firearms to be banned from
the courtroom, courthouses and court facilities except for those persons
properly trained and charged with providing security at these locations.”295
The same should apply to litigation-related meetings, such as depositions
and settlement conferences that occur in other locations—especially for the
lawyers conducting these meetings. This is not the first time the
American Bar Association has ventured into the area of firearm policy. In
addition to firearms in courthouses, the ABA responded to the
Parkland Shooting by issuing a resolution to the House of Delegates,
demonstrating its opposition to laws and policies that propose arming
teachers with guns.296 The ABA also published a resolution that urged the
government to allow individuals to voluntarily request their name be added
to the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) in order
to prevent themselves from purchasing firearms.297
In previous years, the ABA has taken a stance on numerous gun violence
issues. For example, the ABA is in favor of legal procedures, such as
295. ABA Standing Comm. on Gun Violence, supra note 230.
296. ABA Standing Comm. on Gun Violence, Res. 19M106A (Jan. 2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_interest/gun_violence/policy/19M106A/ [https://
perma.cc/DLK2-EC34]. The ABA noted that a study conducted by the Division of Public Safety
Leadership at Johns Hopkins University School of Education, found that arming teachers would
increase the risk of students being shot at school by creating opportunities for teachers to use lethal
force unnecessarily. Id. Additionally, the chance of bystander injury was taken into consideration,
looking at the fact that even law enforcement officers who receive extensive training only hit their
target successfully 18% of the time due to the psychological stress. Id.
297. ABA Standing Comm. on Gun Violence, Res. 19M106B – NICS Self Reporting, (Jan. 2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_interest/gun_violence/policy/19M106B/
[https://
perma.cc/9JHA-C9Q9].
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Gun Violence Restraining Orders (GRVO), which allow courts to remove
guns from individuals exhibiting dangerous behaviors by authorizing a
restraining order.298 The ABA voiced its opposition to legislation that
truncates physicians’ rights to inquire about their patients’ gun ownership
and inform patients of the dangers of owning guns in a household.299 In
addition, the ABA advocated laws that impose restrictions on concealed
carry while opposing laws that would require states to recognize permits
issued by other states.300 With respect to the NICS, the ABA has
admonished the Department of Justice to rescind a memorandum allowing
agencies not to report to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which has
stagnated the accuracy of the NICS.301 The ABA also addressed
microstamping, a new technology that enables law enforcement to solve
gun-related crimes.302 Specifically, the Honorable Robert B. Collings wrote
a report on behalf of the ABA imploring the federal government to follow
the example set by California and the District of Columbia legislatures by
“requiring that all newly-manufactured semi-automatic pistols be fitted with
microstamping technology.”303
The ABA’s contributions to our gun policy discourse have been timely,
balanced, and well-reasoned. In essence, their specific policy proposals
should be the gold standard for legislators when it comes to firearm
298. ABA Standing Comm. on Gun Violence, Res. 17A118B (Aug. 2017),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_interest/gun_violence/policy/17a118b/
[https://
perma.cc/8YHC-Y3HG].
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regulations. For this reason, the ABA would be the ideal source of a new
policy in this area, discouraging lawyers from openly carrying firearms to
adversarial meetings; a co-sponsorship by the Standing Committee on Gun
Violence and the Center for Professional Responsibility would be ideal. Of
course, an enforceable ethical rule would have to come from each state’s
bar, ethics committee, or disciplinary authority. As our society becomes
increasingly violent and openly carried firearms become even more
prevalent, the legal profession must rise above this social decay and maintain
appropriate decorum and professionalism as we provide legal
representation.
An express rule prohibiting lawyers from openly carrying firearms to
depositions and other adversarial meetings, or doing so through others
(clients, staff, or agents), would be helpful in two ways—the same two ways
that existing rules are beneficial. On the one hand, a clear rule provides a
definitive benchmark for assessing complaints and grievances. Feeling
intimidated by another person’s visible weapon is an inherently subjective
injury, difficult to measure or quantify, and can vary subtly depending on
the setting and individuals involved. A bright-line rule provides necessary
guidance for lawyer disciplinary authorities (say, a state grievance committee
or a judge deciding whether to sanction a litigant). It can also benefit a
victim, who may feel threatened and intimidated, but may also have selfdoubt about the reasonableness of her concerns, or insecurity about how
others would respond if the intimidated person speaks up. A clear rule
signals to the affronted individual that their concerns are legitimate and that
the other person’s conduct is indeed objectionable. On the other hand, clear
ethical rules help shape the norms of professionalism for the legal
community and the individual attorney. Rather than being a ceiling on
lawyers’ allowable behaviors, ethical rules are a floor that lawyers aspire to
rise above—there is no upper limit on professionalism. Vague rules may
provide aspirational goals, but a clear rule is something to stay far above and
assumes that most lawyers already aspire to professionalism and excellence.

